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CHAPTER I 
INT~ODUCTION 
The ancient doctrine of governmental immunity from tort 
liability is being increasingly challenged today by lawyers, 
jurists, educational writers, and lay persons. This slow 
but persistent assault on the wall of immunity set up by the 
courts has caused widespread concern on the part of school 
officials and employees. 
The rapid increase in the school-age population of the 
United States in recent years has caused added pressure on 
already crowded educational facilities. The task of the 
teacher in supervising children under these difficult con-
ditions has become hazardous and the likelihood of litigation 
involving the teacher and his pupils increases each year. 
Modern educational practice extends beyond the earlier "four-
walls" concept of instruction. The extension of the teach-
er's role into broadened teaching areas has created new legal 
relationships imposing a gr~ater obligation on the teacher 
to possess at least a fundamental knowledge of the liability 
provisions of school law. 
1 
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Purpose of Study 
It is generally recognized that education is one of the 
most important functions of state and local governments. 
This importance is exemplified by our compulsory attendance 
laws and our ever-increasing expenditures for education. 
There appears to be a slow modification of the govern-
mental immunity from tort liability doctrine by the courts 
and the legislatures of the states. This study will trace 
certain aspects of governmental immunity modification in 
selected states. It is hoped that recommendations can be 
made or guide= lines developed which may reduce costly legal 
entanglements and encourage school personnel to make the 
school premises safe and provide adequate supervision of the 
student body. 
It may, in the future, prove difficult to secure board 
members, administrators, teachers, and service personnel 
unless liability insurance or some other form of protection 
is secured. The salary schedule in most schools is so low 
at present that potential applicants may be unwilling to 
accept the additional burden of a possible lawsuit. 
Teachers should realize that they must always take pre-
cautionary measures to prevent pupil injuries. They should 
have a basic understanding of the legal principles of negli~ 
gence and tort liability. This study will attempt to present 
important legal concepts and tort liability trends in a con-
cise form useful to all educators. It will be especially 
concerned with the effect of liability trends on the agents 
and employees of the public school. 
Statement of Problem 
3 
Our changing society and the role played by the schools 
has caused many informed persons to press for a re-examina-
tion of the immunity doctrine. Schools are engaged in trans-
portation, entertainment, food service, retailing, and a host 
of other activities far removed from earlier concepts of 
education. As the schools have become involved in these 
ever-expanding activities, the risks of individual liability 
have multiplied. In our modern society, should the individ-
ual's interest in being reimbursed for injuries suffered 
through negligence of the school district's agents and em-
ployees give way to a greater interest of the public at large 
in effective operation of the schools? This fundamental 
question is only one of many that may arise if the trend to 
a brogate governmental immunity for tort liability continues. 
Does the increasing practice of purchasing liability 
insurance completely waive immunity, or does it waive it only 
to the extent of the insurance? Unless the purchasing of 
liability insurance is compulsory, would it not be possible 
to secure damages in one district, but not in another for 
similar injuries? If damages cannot be satisfied from reg-
ular revenue, a special assessment may be required. What if 
this special assessment pushes the levy above the constitu-
tional or statutory limit? If a small school is unable to 
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satisfy a judgment rendered against it in a reasonable time, 
would the district be forced to annex to a financially 
stronger district? Would the annexing district have a 
choice in this procedure? 
What effect will the abrogation have on the officers 
and employees of the district? Will the out-of-class activ-
ities be drastically curtailed? Will field trips be elim-
inated? Will the teacher-pupil relationship worsen? How 
much of the teacher's time will be taken up by court action? 
Is the "save harmless" legislation now in effect in several 
states the ultimate answer? Will litigation increase to the 
extent that the very educational process itself is 
threatened? 
Background of Study 
In the United States, unlike most other countries of 
the world, the national government theoretically has no 
direct control in the field of public education. Education 
is not mentioned in the Federal Constitution so under our 
system of enumerated and reserved powers, it becomes a func-
tion reserved for the states. Except for Hawaii, the states 
have established local school districts with boards of educa-
tion to operate the schools. By this policy, public educa-
tion is kept closer to the control of the people than most 
other aspects of state government. 
The pattern for organizing and administering the public 
schools in the fifty states varies greatly in detail, but 
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little in terms of general structure, Although actual con-
trol of educational matters remains with the state legisla-
tures which enjoy plenary powers, the operation of the 
schools, except in Hawaii, is largely delegated to local 
boards of education. These boards operate the schools as 
"quasi-corporations" which means they have limited powers or 
specifically those granted by the state to educate the 
pupils. 
School districts, a.s arms of the state engaged in car-
rying oµt the educational plan of the state, generally fall 
within the category of state agencies immune from.liability 
for torts committed while engaged in their governmental 
function. 
Immunity from tort liability enjoyed by the state and 
its sub=agencies is usually based on the ancient theory of 
sovereignty, whereby "the king could do no wrong." In 
America, we had no king, but the state was assumed to be 
sovereign and as an involuntary a.rm of the state, the school 
usually was given immunity also. 
Method and Procedure 
The project undertaken is one of historical research 
and the techniques employed in legal research will be 
utilized. 
The origin of the governmental immunity doctrine will 
be reviewed and its American background stemming from cer-
tain landmark cases will be traced. The historical 
philosophy behind the doctrine and the present change in 
philosophy will be researched and delineated. 
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An examination of the statutes and constitutions of the 
states selected for the study will be made and those having 
statutory or constitutional provisions dealing with waiver 
of immunity will be studied in greater depth. State attorney 
generals' opinions will be reviewed in the selected states 
a.nd those dealing with tort liability and especially the 
effect of liability insurance on immunity will be carefully 
analyzed. 
The principal phase of the study will consist of locata 
ing pertinent court cases through use of the National Report-
er System. These cases will be checked by using Shepherd's 
citations for subsequent judicial rulings. An analysis of 
the cases will be made to trace the trend toward abrogation 
of governmental immunity from tort liability and to determine 
the implications of these judicial decisions for school per-
sonnel today. 
Data in this i;esearch will be limited to tort liability 
relating to actual bodily injury. It will not include psy-
chological and emotional stress that might have led to 
bodily injury and no attempt will be made to research con-
tractual liability or workmen's compensation~ 
States selected for the study are New York, California, 
Illinois, and Oklahoma. The sample states of New York, 
California, and Illinois were chosen because they have appar-
ently abrogated immunity either by judicial decisions, 
statutory provisions, or both. Oklahoma was selected 
because it seems to be one of the states still maintaining 
the wall of immunity around school districts. 
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Court decisions to be investigated in the selected 
states will be limited to decisions of the supreme court or 
highest state court. The opinions of attorney generals and 
statutes will be limited to the current opinions and stat-
utes. The court cases, attorney generals' rulings and 
statutes will be placed in broad categories according to the 
type of activity and the agent or employee involved. The 
weight of opinion or general procedure followed in each 
category will be summarized in a nontechnical form readily 
comprehended by the school staff. Attention will also be 
given those legal patterns that appear to deviate markedly 
from normal procedure. 
Definition of Terms 
Abrogate. To abolish or revoke a previously held doctrine 
by authority. 
Action. An ordinary proceeding in a court by which one party 
prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of 
a right, the redress of a wrong, or the punishment of a 
public offense. In common language, a "suit" or "law-
suit." 
Agent. One who undertakes to transact some business, or to 
manage some affair for another, by authority and on 
account of the latter, and to render an account of it. 
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Assault. An attempt to beat another, without touching himo 
Attractive nuisance. A condition, instrumentality, machine 
or other agency, dangerous to young children because of 
their inability to appreciate its danger, because they 
may be expected to be attracted to it. 
Battery. An unlawful beating or other wrongful physical 
violence inflicted on another without his consent. The 
offer to commit a battery is an assault. Assault and 
battery are usually used together. 
Common lawo The case decisions of courts and administrative 
agencies, as distinguished from enacted legislation. 
Damages. Compensation or indemnity which may be recovered 
in court by the person who has suffered loss or injury 
to his person, property, or rights through the unlawful 
act or negligence of anothero 
Decision. A judgment rendered by a competent tribunal. 
Defendanto The party against whom relief or recovery is 
sought in a court action. 
Employees. Administrators, teachers, bus drivers, custodi-
ans and other service personnel of the school. 
Governmental immunity. Immunity from tort actions enjoyed 
by governmental units in common-law states. 
In _loco parentis. In place of the parent; charged with some 
of the parents' rights, duties, and responsibilities. 
Judicial citations. Reference to court decisions, citations 
in the case materials in this study refer to official 
state reports and the National Reporter System. 
Landmark case. A very significant court case. 
Liability. The state of being bound or obligated in law or 
justice to do, pay, or make good on something. 
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Libel. Written defamation of another person's character. 
Negligence. The omission to do something which a reasonable 
man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily 
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the 
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man 
would not do. 
Plaintiff. Person who brings an action; he who sues by fil-
ing a complaint. 
Plenary. Complete power, usually applied to legislatures 
over matters within their entire jurisdiction. 
Precedent. A decision considered as furnishing an example 
or authority for an identical or similar case afterward 
arising on a similar question of law. 
Quasi-Corporation. An organization with semi-corporate pow-
ers ; it is created by the state with limited powers to 
act in the place of the state for a given local area. 
Respondeat Superior. The responsibility of the master for 
acts of his servant or agent. 
Save harmless. To exempt or reserve from harm. Where a 
statute reserves or saves vested rights. 
School officials. School board members, trustees, clerks, 
and treasurers. 
Stare decisis. Principle that when a court has made a 
declaration of a legal principle, it is the law until 
10 
changed by competent authority; upholding of precedents 
within the jurisdiction • 
. Statute. Act passed by the legislature. 
Tort. In modern practice, is used to denote an injury as 
wrongful act. A private or civil wrong or injury. A 
wrong independent of contract. 
Ultra vires. Acts beyond the scope of authority. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Origin of Governmental Immunity From 
Tort Liability Doctrine 
One of the chief reasons cited by the courts for school 
distric t immunity has been "the state is sovereign and can-
not be sued without its consent." The theory that "the king 
can do no wrong" is one of the very oldest principles of 
common law. In spite of the fact that we had no king in the 
United States, the principle has been applied by the courts 
to the United States Government and the several states as 
well. Gauerke believes the English idea of immunity of gov-
ernment for injury to citizens is an outgrowth of historical 
events and circumstances. He feels the origins date back to 
feudal times. 1 Blachly and Oatman further explain this 
principle. ~'The doctrine that sovereignty is the highest 
power of the state; that it is subject to no law, and that it 
resides in the monarch, did much to place the state in a 
position of irresponsibility for its torts. 11 2 
lwarren E. Gauerke, School Law (New York, 1965). 
2Frederick Frank Blachly and Miriam E. Oatman, Adminis~-
trative Lefislation and Adjudication (Washington, D. C., 
1934), p. 82. -
11 
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Garber believes the judicial origin of the immunity 
doctrine "may be traced to two cases, one decided in England 
--Russell~· The Men Dwelling in the County of Devon--in 
1788; the other decided in Massachusetts--Mower v. Leicester 
--in 1812."3 The cases are very important or so-called 
"landmark cases" because the English and American common law 
pays extraordinary deference to precedents. The judges of 
one state usually follow the decisions of judges of another 
state. It should be noted that the Russell case was later 
overruled by the English Courts, and that in 1890 it was 
definitely established that in England a school board or 
school district is subject to suit in tort for personal 
injuries on the same basis as a private individual or cor-
poration.4 
Reasons for Justifying Governmental Immunity 
Anglo-Saxon law included the rule of stare decisis--"to 
stand by decided cases." Under this theory, once a point of 
law has been decided by the highest court of appeal, it is 
fixed law and can be changed only by legislation. The prin-
ciple of stare _decisis or following of precedents applies 
only to decisions of the highest courts. Wormser gives a 
clear concept of this principle: 
3Lee O. Garber, Yearbook of School .Law (Danville, Ill., 
1965), p. 235. -~ -
4American Law Reports Annotated (San Francisco, 1962), 
2d, 86, p. 474.-
For example, a judge in the Supreme Court of New 
York does not have to follow a decision by another judge of his own courto He can differ and the true 
rule of law may not be known until the case has 
been appealed to a higher court for final decision. 
The principle of stare decisis i~ not absolutely 
immutable. Courts, on occasions, have reversed 
themselves, when they thought that conditions had 
changed sufficiently to warrant, or when they were 
willing to admit that.they had previously been in 
error. 
We have separate legal jurisdiction in the 
U. S., therefore it is not surprising to find that 
the principle does not compel a court of one state 
to follow a precedent set by courts of another. 
Each state may interpret its domestic law as it 
sees fit, and the highest court of a state cannot 
be overruled even by the U. S. Supreme Court un= 
less the question comes under the Federal Consti-
tution. When a point of law is settled in one 
state, a·. lawyer in another state has no assurance 
that his own courts will follow it, and So we have 
duplication of decisions as well as duplications 
of statutes.5 
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Frequently the courts refer to other reasons for justi-
fying governmental innnunity. Gauerke6 and Garber7 list 
similar sets of reasons: 
1. Schools should not be charged with liability since 
they receive no advantage from operating schools. 
2. School districts have only those powers given them 
by the legislatures and state school officers, not including 
permission to connnit errors. 
5Rene 8 Albert Wormser, The Story of the Law and the Men 
Who Made It From the Earliest Time to the Present~ew""Yo"rk"; 
'I9o2J,p.38-g:- -· ·- - -· 
6 Gauerke, p. 86. 
7Lee O. Garber, Law and the School Business Manager 
(Danville, Ill., 1957-Y:-p:-I9S:-
14 
3o School taxes are trust funds, not to be used to pay 
claims. 
4. School property is exempt from attachment. 
5 •. The personal interest of private.citizens must give 
way to the idea of public good. 
One or more of these reasons is often given in addition 
to the comm.only used principle of state sovereignty. In the 
Molitor case, the Supreme Court of Illinois, however, in 
forceful language, met every reason given above and declared 
' 
them all outmoded or not legally sound. The court went on 
to overturn governmental immunity in Illinois.a 
Education As a State Function 
Although the federal government has always encouraged 
education, the words "education" or "school" are not to be 
found in the Constitution. Garber in his Handbook of School 
----·-··---
.~ points out that education is a state function. As a 
result of the Tenth Amendment, the courts have repeatedly 
held that the matter of maintaining a system of public 
schools is reserved to the states. The legislature, unless 
restricted by the constitution has unlimited discretion • 
. "So it may be said that the power of the legislature over 
education is plenary. 119 
8Molitor Y.• .Kaneland.Communiti Unit District~. 302, 
163 N. E. (2d) 89 (Illinois, 1959). 
9Lee 0. Garber, Handbook of School _Law (New London, 
Conn., 1954), pp. 4-5. ·~ 
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Pierce notes that the state courts "have repeatedly 
upheld the doctrine that in America, education is a function 
of the state and is, therefore fundamentally a matter of 
state policy. It would seem.that even if the state consti• 
tutions or statutes failed to mention education, it would 
still be a state function.10 
The Supreme Court of Indiana gave a clear statement of 
the relative status of the individual, the local government 
and the state in an early case~ 
The right of local self-government is an inherent 
not a derivative, oneo Individualized, it is the 
right which man possesses in virtue of his charac-
ter as a free man. It is not bestowed by the leg-
islatures, nor derived from statutes. But the 
courts which have carried to its utmost extent the 
doctrine of local self-government have never so 
much as intimated that it exists as to a matter 
over which the constitution has given the law-
making power supreme control; nor have they gone 
beyond the line which separates matter of purely 
local concern from those of state control. Essen-
tially and intrinsically the schools in which are 
educated and trained the children who are to become 
the rulers of the conunonwealth are matters of 
state, and not of local, jurisdiction. In such 
matters the state is a unit and the legislature 
the source of power. It is for the law-making 
power to determine whether the authority shall 
be exercised by a state board of education, or 
distributed to county, township, or city organi-
zations throughout the state.11 · 
The legislature may enact any law it sees fit concerning 
education consistent with state and federal constitutions, 
but it cannot delegate legislative authority to another 
lOTruman Mitchell Pierce, Federal, Local and State Gov-
ernment in Education (Washington, D. C., I96li"),~ 83. ,--. 
llstate ~ rel Clark~· Haworth, 23 N.E. 946 (Indiana, 
1890). 
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agency. Goldhannner indicates that the pattern is to delegate 
the state's responsibility in education to specially created, 
local subdivisions. He states that school boards exist only 
to provide for the maintenance of the public schools in.the 
area subject to their jurisdiction.12 
Hamilton, in a similar vein, says that: 
Local school districts are in fact state agen-
cies, therefore it follows that members of local 
boards of education are state and not local offi-
cers. They have only such powers as the legislature, 
by specific law, confers upon them, and those powers 
which are implied for the purpose of enabling r~ards 
to carry out their express legislative powers. . 
The legal basis of public education can be found in con-
stitutional law, statutory law or case law. States have com-
plete authority over schools if they choose to ·exercise it, 
limited only.by violation of constitutional provisions. Al-
though legal responsibility for education clearly resides w:i.th 
the state, the actual exercise of this responsibility is not 
as clear-cut as the placing of legal respopsibility indicates. 
School districts can operate only through their officers 
and employeesa Officers and employees are, therefore, 
-
referred to as agents of the districts. Ip most states the 
immunity doctrine holds that a district may not be required 
to pay for the wrongful acts of its board members, teachers, 
and other employees. Hamilton attacks this doctrine by 
pointing out that: 
12Keith Goldhammer, The School Board (New York, 1964), 
pp. 15=16. ~-
13Robert R. Hamilton, g6,al_Ri~hts and Liabilities of Teachers (Laramie,.Wyo., 19 , pq • 
oeodistricts may, for example, permit the school 
premises to become dangerous or employ incompetent 
bus drivers or other employees from which injury 
or damage results, but it is protected by the old 
obsolete and unjust immunity rule.14 
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He goes on to advocate the rule be abolished by legislative 
enactment and the districts be required to carry liability 
insurance for the protection of their children. 
Garber, in his Handbook_£f School~' correctly states 
that "school officers are not generally held individually 
liable for torts of the school corporation, on the ground 
that action by the board is not the action of school offi-
cers personally. 1115 He goes on to say that "school officers 
are not liable for injuries resulting from errors in judg-
ment .. 1116 Unless they act in bad faith or from corrupt or 
malicious motives)) they are not personally liable for torts 
committed by the boards' employees and contractors. They 
are, however, "liable for injuries resulting from their 
refusal to act, from failure to perform ministerial or dis-
cretionary duties, and from the improper performance of min= 
isterial duties which are imposed upon the individual 
officers .nl 7 
14Ibid., p. 5. 
15Garber, Handbook of School~' pp. 85=86. 
16rbid. 
17Ibid. 
18 
The,Negligence Theory 
The personal liability of teachers does not come under 
the governmental immunity rule. The principle underlying a 
teacher's liability is that of negligence. Negligence as a 
separate tort emerged about 1825 according to Garber. He 
believes certain elements are necessary to establish 
negligence: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
The duty to act as to protect others from 
unnecessary risks 
The failure to so act 
The injury, of another, causing los·fa.or dam .. 
age, as the result of such failure. Y 
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff and juries, and 
judges differ on what constitutes negligence. Gauerke 
defines negligence as "any conduct which falls below the 
standard established by law for the protection of others 
against unreasonable harm. 1119 Under the legal system of the 
United States every person enjoys the right to be free from 
bodily injury, intentionally or carelessly caused by others. 
Nolte and Linn view negligence as "the failure to use 
such care and caution as a hypothetically reasonable and 
prudent person would ordinarily have exercised under the 
same or similar conditions. 11 20 Hamilton also notes there is 
no rule=of-thumb for determining what is negligent action in 
18Garber, ~.and.~. School. Business Manager, Po 194. 
19aauerke, p. 87. 
2~. Chester Nolte and John Phillip Linn, School~ 
for Teachers (Danville, Ill., 1963), p. 243. 
19 
all cases.21 It should be emphasized that it is only the 
negligence of the dist~ict employees, such as teachers, that 
involves them i~ legal action. They do not guarantee that 
no injuries or damages will result from their acts. 
The ,legal cause of an injury has been defined as. "that 
cause which in the natural sequence of events produced the 
result. 11 22 .. An unbroken connection is necessary between the 
negligent act and the injury. The N. E. ~., in a booklet 
called Who.1,! Liable £2!._Pupil_Injuries? points out that the 
courts consider the nature of the conduct, legal cause of 
injury and forseeability of harm. 
An act· of negligence may be one which involves· 
unreasonable risk of harm to others, even though it 
is done with reasonable care, skill, preparation 
and warning. The negligence is inherent in the act. 
In other types of conduct, the act may become neg-
ligent through the lack of care, skill, preparation, 
or warning, although the act in itself would not 
have constituted negligent conduct had reasonab123 
care; skill, preparation, or warning been used. 
Nolte and Linn sum up the discussion of the nature of negli-
gence by saying it is what a jury of twelve people say it 
is.24 
Garber lists seven specific cases whereby a school 
employee may be negligent: 
21 · Hamilton, p. 30. 
22Garber, !:filt and_the.School_Business_Manager, p. 195. 
23wb_o_ is.Liable for Pu9il Injuries? NEA Research Divi-sion, (Washington, D~"c:"~ 1 63), p. 11. 
24Nolte and Linn, p. 2440 
(1) Allows pupils to use dangerous devices although 
they were not competent to do so 
(2) Does not control abnormal pupils 
{3)·Does not give adequate warning 
(4) Acts without sufficient skill 
(5) Does not make sufficient preparation 
(6) Fails to inspect and repair mechanical devices 
(7) Prevents someone else from assisting a pupil, 
although the peril was not caused by his 
negligence ZS · . 
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Some of the defenses used against negligence are inter-
vening cause, contributory negligence, "last clear chance 
theory, and plaintiff assuned risko Perhaps the one most 
successfu;t.ly used is intervening cause. If it can be estab-
lished to the satisfaction of the jury that the connection 
between.the allegedly negligent act and the injury has been 
broken, then the defendant is not liable. Contributory 
negligence is not too successful as a defense since most 
cases involve children and greater care must be exercised by 
those in charge than if the case involved adults alone. The 
last clear chance theory implies that the injured person had 
more opportunity to avoid the accident than the defendant 
did to cause it. The defense that the plaintiff assumed the 
risk is usually effective in athletic events where some risk 
/ 
of injury is bound to be assumed. 
Regardless of the status of inmiunity from tort liability 
for the school district in a particular state, the teacher 
or other employee is not immune from suit for negligence in 
any state and is protected only to the .extent of liability 
insurance or save harmless legislationo 
25Garber, L~w and_~ School_Business Manager, p. 1980 
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Save Harmless Statutes 
The changing public attitude toward tort liability has 
caused several states to search for some method to protect 
their employeeso Hamilton expresses the sentiments of many 
educators concerning this protection: 
The business of education has become so large that 
it is palpably unfair to impose upon teachers and 
administrators the risks involved in their respec-
tive posit:Lons. At least four states, namely 
Connecticut, New Jersey New York, and Wyoming, 
have enacted so-called 11save harmless" statutes for 
the protection of teachers. These laws req~ire or 
permit districts to pay judgments recovered against 
teachers. It also requires or permits them to 
defend teachers in suits against them for damages 
caused by their negligent acts while in the course 
of their teaching duties. This is enlightened 
legislation and should be adopted widely. It is 
submitted that teacheTs organizations owe the duty 
to its several members to urge the legislatures of 
the respective states to enact such laws. Laws 
imposing tort liability on individuals responsible 
for the school program are obsolete and can not be 
defended in modern society. Districts should be 
required to protect their teachers and cover itself 
(sic) with appropriate insurance. It is unfair to 
everyone concerned to attempt to or.erate a modern 
educational program under ''Model T' tort liability 
laws. Save harmless statutes should be mandatory6 in nature; they should not be merely permissive.Z 
Nolte and Linn write in a similar vein concerning this 
need for protection for school employees: 
Five states have adopted statutes requiring or per-
mitting boards of education to come to the aid of 
school personnel who are found liable for damages 
in pupil injury cases. Four of the five states re-
quire boards to protect and save harmless finan-
cially the teacher who has been required to respond 
in damages for his negligence in the line of duty. 
· 
26Robert R. Hamilton, g6,al Ri~hts and.Liabilities of Teachers (Laramie, Wyo.~ 19 , p.l. 
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One state permits boards to protect 2~e teacher financially if the board so chooses. . 
These state statutes designed to protect school employ-
ees are usually patterned after the save harmless law passed 
by New York in 1937. This law also included an authorization 
to carry liability insurance. A closer examination of the 
statute in New York should provide some clarity to the dis-
cussion which follows. 
New York, unlike most other states in the United States, 
applied the common-law principle of respondeat superior or 
holding an employer liable for the torts of his employees in 
school cases. The ''save harmless i.aw11 28 provided that judg .. , 
ment obtained against an employee is payable out of .school 
funds under certain circumstances. The New York courts 
interpreted the· "save harmless" law as, in effect, imposing 
direct liability on the school board, saying it was unneces-
sary to sue an employee and obtain a judgment first and then 
seek settlement of the judgment from the school board. 29 The 
terminology "save harmless" comes from its usage in the New 
York statute.of which a key portion is given below: 
Liability of a board of education, trustee, 
trustees, or board of cooperative educational 
services. Not withstanding'any inconsistent pro-
vision of law, general, special, or local, or the 
limitation contained in the provisions of any city 
27M. Chester Nolte and John Phillip Linn, School Law for 
Teachers (Danville, Ill., 1963), pp. 266-267. --- ---
28New_Yo~k Education Law, Section 3023. 
-=i-- - ·-
(2d) 
29Reeder_y. _Board of Education of New ~_City, 50 N.E. 
236 (New York, 194~. · _ · 
charter, it shall be the duty of each board of 
education, trustee, trustees, in any school dist_rict 
having a population of less than one million, and 
each board of cooperative educational services 
established pursuant to section nineteen hundred and 
fifty ... eight of this chapter, to save harmless and 
protect all teachers and members of supervisory and 
administrative staff or employees from financial 
loss arising out of any claim, demand, suit, or judgment by reason of alleged negligence or other 
act resulting in. accidental bodily injury to any 
person within or without the school building, 
provided such teacher or member of the supervisory 
or administrative staff or employee at the time of 
the accident or injury was acting in the discharge 
of his duties within the scope·. of his employment 
and/or under the direction of said board of edu-
cation, trustee, trustees or board of cooperative 
educational services: and said board of educa-
tion, trustee, trustees or board of cooperative 
educational services may arrange for and maintain 
appropriate insurance with any insurance company 
created by or under the laws of this state, or in 
any insurance company authorized by law to trans-
act business in this state, or such board, trustee, 
trustees or board of cooperative service may elect 
to act as self-insurers to maintain the aforesaid 
protection.30 
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The Reeder case decided by the New York court furnishes 
further clarity to the "save ha:i::'mless"·:statute. 31·_ In this .·:~ 
case: the teacher and the Board were"named as defendants whena 
boy was hurt assisting the teacher move an automobile motor 
on a dolly •. Before the trial, action was discontinued 
against the teacher and the board's defense was the interpre= 
tation of the "save harmless" statute providing for indemnity 
by the board to the teacher for any loss sustained by the 
latter's negligence. The plaintiff urged that the statute 
_30New.York Education.Law, Sec. 3023. 
_31Reeder Y.· _Board of.Education of.New~_City, 50 N.E. 
(2d) 236 (New York, 1941)". · · 
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imposes on the board direct liability to persons injured 
through the negligence of its teachers and other employeeso 
To this the court concurred and awarded damages to the plain-
tiff9 After this decision the courts have held it was un-
necessary to sue an employee and obtain judgment first and 
then seek settlement of the judgment from the school boardo 
It is theoretically possible for a district required to 
pay damages because of the negligence of. one of its agents 
or employees, to seek indemnity from the individual whose 
negligence caused the district's liability. Therefore these 
"save harmless" statutes do not entirely relieve individuals 
from responsibility for their negligent acts although the 
.district is not likely to seek.this indemnity because of the 
financial condition of its employeeso32 
Other states have minor variations from the New York 
law. California, directly through its statute, provides for 
action against a school district on account of injury to 
person or property arising out of the negligence of its offi-
cers or employees.33 Like New York, California does not 
cover school board members acting as agents of the Board. 
California does require the District Attorney to defend em-
ployees sued for negligence while in the line of duty. Most 
other state "save harmless" laws require boards to furnish 
legal counsel and pay expenses of defense. Wyoming's law 
32Lee O. Garber, Law and.the School Business Manager 
(Danville, Ill., 1957)7Ii'.~o:--
33california_Education_Code, Sections 1026-1029. 
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covers only teachers, supervisors and administrators while 
New J·ersey' s law covers all employees and members of the 
board of education. Washington has a law similar to Cali-
fornia's law concerning direct suit against boards of educa-
tion. In the Washington statute however, accidents involving 
playgrounds, athletic apparatus, and manual training equip-
ment are excluded. 
In addition to New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, 
Wyoming, California and Washington, four other states have 
enacted at least modified "save harmless" laws during the 
1965~66 legislative sessions. Illinois in S. B. 801 provided 
for "save harmless" protection rather than insurance for 
school officers and employees; including student teachers. 
Florida Ch. 65-42 authorizes county school boards to provide 
legal service for employees who may be sued for damages for 
accidents occurring while on duty supervising, and gives 
legal status to student teachers so as to provide similar 
protection. Utah s. B. 4 and Nevada S. B. 185 passed nearly 
identical laws waiving immunity from suit of state and polit-
ical subdivisions including school districts and providing 
that public funds may be used to insure public employees 
against liability for injury due to their negligent acts or 
omissions. The Nevada statute has a recovery limit of 
$25,000.00. 
Generally these laws do not affect the basic liability 
of the district, but they do make the district liable for the 
payment of damages assessed by a court against an employee 
26 
for injuries to a.third party arising out of the employee's 
negligence when acting within the scope of his employment 
and in the line of duty. The teacher is therefore "saved" 
from financial "harm" by the district's paying the judgment. 
Nolte and Linn summarize the benefits of "save harmless"· 
statutesi 
The teacher who must pay damages for a single 
mistake in conduct may be saddled with a judgment 
for the remainder of his professional life or be 
forced into bankruptcy proceedings. The growing 
complexity of the educational enterprise indicates 
that the number of pupil injury cases will doubt-
less increaseo In the interests of school morale, 
boards will find it increasingly expedient to . 
"save harmless" those who. are taking the risks in 
classrooms throughout the land. State associa-
tions of school boards should therefore urge the 
enactment of mandatory save harmless legislation 
in their ~tates. Teachers' associations can do 
no less.34 
Liability Insurance 
One of the most important exceptions to the doctrine of 
school district innnunity still found in most states is 
through legislation which permits or requires local school 
boards to carry liability insurance.35 About twenty states 
specifically require that liability insurance be carried on 
school buses·and approximately twenty others permit local 
boards to carry such insurance. 
In only four states, Alabama, Mississippi, 
South Dakota and Texas, are school boards forbidden 
34Nolte and Linn, pp. 266-670 
35Who is Liable for Pupil_Injuries? NEA (Washington, 
D.C., 1~)-;-pp. 65-6~ 
by court decisions, attorney general opinions, or 
other rulings from insuring their buses against lia-
bility and Alabama and Mississippi otherwise provide 
for the ~ayment of pupil transportation accident 
claimso3o 
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It should be noted that where legislation requires or 
authorizes a school district to purchase liability insurance, 
the immunity of .the district is not waived by taking out the 
insuranceo These statutes usually specify that recovery of 
damages resulting from negligence may be had only up to the 
limit of lnsurance carried. Since tax money is used to pay 
insurance premiums, courts have traditionally held that a 
school district has no legal power to carry liability insur-
ance unless the legislature authorizes it. 
Oklahoma's statute concerning liability insurance for 
transportation accidents is typical of those statutes in 
states where liability has not been waived. 
The board of education of any school district 
authorized to furnish transportation may purchase 
insurance for the purpose of paying damages to per-
sons sustaining injuries proximately caused by the 
operation of motor vehicles used in transporting 
school childreno The operation of said vehicles 
by school districts, however, is hereby declared to 
be a public governmental function, and no action 
for damages shall be brought against a school dis-
trict under the provisions of this Section but may 
be brought against the insurer, and the amount of 
the damages recoverable shall be collectible from 
said insurer only. The provisions of this Section 
shall no.t be construed as creating any liability 
whatever against any school district which does 
not provide said insurance.37 
36Ibid., p. 65. 
37school Laws of Oklahoma, 1965. 
----~--- . -----
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In a few states it is permissible for a state to act as 
a self-insurero California is an example and the law is as 
follows: 
In districts situated within or partly within 
cities having a population of more than 50,000, any 
board of education may provide from its own funds 
for the purpose of covering the liability of the 
district, its officers, agents and employees, in 
lieu of carrying insurance in insurance companies 
as provided in Section 1029. Nothing contained 
herein shall be construed as prohibiting the board 
of education of the district from providing protec-
tion against such liability partly by means of its 
own funds and partly by means of insurance written 
.by insurance companies as provided in Section 
1029038 
Many prominent writers in the field feel that liability 
insurance, not only in transportation, but in other areas as 
well, is necessary if schools are to fulfill their responsi-
bility to the pupils and the public as well. Gauerke, in 
his recent book School,~, says: 
_As long as judges are reluctant to act as lawmakers 
by over-throwing the long-settled principle of 
innnunity-from-suit for torts enjoyed by government, 
then insurance protects against the disaster of a 
large verdict. Safeguarding others who must get 
involved with the educational program is a moral 
and legal responsibility of the school district. 
School boards cannot take too much caution to pre-
vent injuries. Insurance rightly spreads the risks 
involved.3~ 
The pupil in most instances is required by law to be in 
school and needs some protection if· injured. The teacher 
too needs some protection since by the very nature of his 
job he is vulnerable to suits for damages. These suits arise 
38california Education.Code, Section 1029.1. 
39warren EQ Gauerke, School~ (New York, 1965), p. 10~ 
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because of some· act or incident which causes harm to the body 
or property of another person and which is due to the alleged 
negligence of the teacher in performing his duties. 
In a few states the statutes either make the school.dis-
trict liable for the negligence of its employees or else 
authorize the use of district funds for paying judgments 
against teachers and other personnel. In.the remaining 
states, teachers must pay damages when judgments are handed 
down against them unless state law allows the district to 
purchase liability insurance for its employees, or the em-
ployees either purchase it themselves or procure it through 
membership in an outside organization. 
Teachers in increasing numbers are protecting themselves 
against tort liability by insurance and the state teachers' 
associations in Ohio, Vermont and Maryland have blanket pol~ 
icies covering their entire membership. 
Governmental-Proprietary Distinction 
In holding school districts immune from liability for 
torts, many authorities predicate such immunity on the gov-
ernmental nature of the functions which such districts were 
performing at the time of the commission of the tort.40 
Other authorities hold that a school district, being only a 
quasi~corporation not clothed with full corporate powers, 
cannot be sued in tort for negligence or wrongful acts 
40sanders _v. City. of Long. Beach~ 129 P. (2d) 511 (California, 191;'2). 
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regardless of whether such acts were committed in governmen-
tal or proprietary capacity.41 Still other courts take the 
position that school.districts, school boards, and other 
agencies or authorities created exclusively for the purpose 
of conducting public schools of elementary or high school 
grades are merely public agencies or instrumentalities of the 
state, established for the sole purpose of administering the 
state system of public ·education, and that all their author-
ized functions or activities are of. a governmental charac-
ter.42,43 In the Rose case cited above, the court stated 
that: 
A board of education is a quasi-municipal corpora-
tion and its operation of a public school system 
including school playgrounds, constitutes the per-
formance of a governmental function as distinguished 
from a proprietary one, and with respect to tort 
liability, is governed by the same rules applica-
ble to a city or other governmental4!nstrumentality 
engaged in a governmental function. 
There is no general agreement on the distinction between 
governmental and proprietary functions. In New Jersey, the 
court concluded that a municipally operated swimming pool is 
not a governmental activity45 while in Connecticut the court 
came to the opposite conclusion in holding that a municipally 
4lshirkey .!,• __ Keokuk County, 281 N.W. 837 (Iowa, 1938) • 
. 42Braun ]!_. Trustees_of_Victoria Independent.School.Dis-
trict, 114 S.W. (2d) 947 (Iexas, 1938). · 
43Rose v. Board of Education of Abilene, 337 P. (2d) (Kansas -;-!9'5'9) • - · · - · 
44rbido 
45weeks v. City of Newark, 168 A. (2d) 211 (New Jersey, 
1961). ·- . -
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operated skating rink is a governmental function.46 It was 
held in an Arizona case that a school district acted in the 
exercise of a proprietary function when it leased its foot-
ball stadium to another school district for compensation, 
and in the exercise thereof it was liable for an injury sus-
tained as a result of n~gligence in the maintenancec!of· .the , 
stadium.47 A recent (1958) case in a Pennsylvania court was 
decided in favor of the plaintiff when it was held that oper-
ating a summer recreational program was a proprietary rather 
than a governmental function.48 A child, who was enrolled 
in the summer program, drowned while playing in a pool. The 
school charged a fee and the court used the following words 
to define proprietary: 
If a district is conducting a given activity 
which a local government unit is not statutorily 
required to perform, or it may be carried on by 
private enterprise, or if it is used as a means of 
raising revenue, then it is a proprietary function. 49 
Most states agree with the court in Illinois in the Ludwig 
case when it said that action could not be sustained on a 
governmental-proprietary distinction because such distinction 
46wolf_vo· Town of Bedford, 167 A. (2d) 924 (Connecticut, 
1960).----
4?sawaya v. _Tucson ~igh :School District, 281 J;>. (2d) 
105 (Arizona, T955). · 
48Morris_~. School_District . .2.f the.Township.of Mount 
Lebonon, 144 A. (2d) 737 (Pennsylvania, 1958). · 
49Ibid. 
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does not apply to quasi=municipal corporations such as school 
districts.so 
School districts seldom have proprietary functions. 
This distinction is more comm.only used in referring to citie& 
If school districts ·are to be held liable, it would seem that 
courts will follow the lead of the Illinois court in the 
Molitor case and make them liable for injury due to negli-
gence regardless of the type of activity.51 
Discretionary vs Ministerial Duties 
.Another distinction sometimes used by the courts to 
decide whether liability accrues to a district or its board 
has been to determine if the activity is mandatory. Gold-
hammer, in discussing the historical and legal foundations of 
the American school board makes this clear differentiation of 
the two·activities: 
A discretionary power of the board is one which 
gives the board the power or right to act in the 
event that it chooses to do so. There is no legal 
necessity to act unless the board considers that 
there are conditions which warrant its performance 
or which necessitate that it make a.decision. In 
some cases in which damages have accrued to indi-
viduals because of a board's failure to act, or 
even of its acting in a fashion that may have been 
construed as negligent, the courts have ruled that 
since the board was operating within the discretion-
ary powers granted to it, there was no legal lia-
bility of board members for either failing to act 
or acting in a negligent fashion. 
SOLudwiij v. _Board .2f. Education, 183 N.E. (2d) 32 
(Illinois, 1 6~). 
51Molitor v. Kaneland Comm.unity l!!!.!!District_No •. 302, 
182 N. E. (2d) i45 (Illinois, 1962). · · 
Ministerial functions are functions which the 
law imposes upon the board and which it must per-
form regardless of the presence of any condition 
which in the minds of the members of the board, 
would indicate a desirability not to act. The 
failure of the board to act when it is clearly 
indicated that the function to be performed is 
ministerial results in the incurring of legal lia-
bility on the part of individual members of the 
school board.52 
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Several courts have expressly rejected any distinction 
between discretionary and ministerial functions in connection 
with tort liability of school districts, school boards, or 
similar agencies or authorities in charge of public 
schools.53,54 The Alaska court held in the Tapscott case 
that a school.district was not liable.for negligence of a 
school bus driver which caused a. collision between his bus 
and an automobile, even though the authority conferred upon 
the territorial board of education to provide transportation 
for school pupils was not mandatory.55 The court said the 
true test was whether or not the transportation of pupils 
was a governmental function, and that the absence of a man-
datory duty did not take the act of transportation out of the 
status of a governmental function. 
A duty is ministerial when the law imposes upon a public 
officer performance 0£ a duty involving no exercise of 
52Keith Goldhammer, ~.School.Board (New York, 1964), 
p. 58. 
53consolidated School District v. Wright, 261 P •. 953 (Oklahoma, 1927). · - ·- -
54Tapscott_y. Page, 17 Alaska 507 (1958). 
55 Ibid. 
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judgment •. He must perfonn such an act and do so in a proper 
manne:r. The performance of many duties by school officers 
requires the exercise of judgment. In order for liability to 
attach to acts of individuals, they must have violated manda-
tory legal prescriptions.56 
Judicial-Legislative Conflict 
As the governmental body fa·rthest removed from the con-
trol of the people, criticism of the judiciary is common at 
all levels and especially at the highest level in the state 
and in the nation. The recent decisions at the national 
level concerning desegregation and religious ceremonies 
brought forth criticism.of the courts not equalled in our 
history. There has been great pressure by the people to 
modify these decisions through curtailing of the courts' 
power by legislative means. The courts have historically 
been conservative and slow to change so perhaps the criticism 
of the Supreme Court as it is presently constituted reflects 
the people's will for the courts to retain their historic 
role of conservatism. 
Judicial=legislative conflict is not new, dating back 
at least as far as the time of John Marshall when the Supreme 
Court first assumed a major role in our governmental struc-
ture. At the state level, the principle of ·governmental 
immunity from tort liability has been the cause of numerous 
56Gauerke, pp. 95=96 .• 
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conflicts between the legislative and judicial branches of 
government .. 
There is no .doubt that the rule of governmental immunity 
can be limited or abrogated entirely by acts of the legisla-
ture. Statutes to this effect are definitely on the increas~, 
and over the years the legislatures of several states have 
enacted statutes which have created a liability of govern-
mental entities for torts in connection with public schools. 
These statutes may waive the state's immunity from liability 
in tort, abrogate the common-law rule of nonliability with 
respect to school districts, render school boards liable for 
the negligence of district officers or employees, or .impose 
liability upon certain educational agencies for negligence 
in the operation of motor vehicles. 
According to the American .~.Reports, in 1962 the rule 
of governmental immunity in regard to torts committed in con-
nection with the public schools has been substantially 
affected by statute in Alaska, California, Connecticut, 
Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, 
Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin.57 Since that time, the 
legislatures of Nevada (S. B. 185) and Utah (S. B. 4)58 have 
also at least partially abrogated governmental immunity in 
their respective states. 
57American Law Reports (annotated 2d, 86 [San Francisco, 
1962]), p. 503. ·-
.. ~8High~Spots in State School Legislation, NEA Research 
D1.v1.s1.ori., School Law Series, 1965. 
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Where the rule of immunity with respect to particular 
torts has been abrogated by legislative enactment or judicial 
decision, the liability of the agency or authority involved 
is, generally speaking, determined by the same rules and 
principles that apply in connection with the liability of 
private persons or corporations. 
It is significant that while a majority of courts con-
sider governmental immunity from tort liability to be out-
moded there is no such agreement concerning abrogation by 
the courts themselves. Even the Molitor case which.is often 
referred to as the "break through" or landmark case in court 
• 
abrogation of immunity from tort liability was not a unani-
mous decision. 59 Davis, in a strong dissent states that the 
common law of England shall be the rule of decision and shall 
be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative 
authority. He further states that: 
Neither Illinois nor any other state of the United 
States adopted the theory of governmental immunity 
from tort liability from the maxim 'the King can do 
no wrong',' as it existed in 1606, but rather predi-
cated such immunity on various theories of the com-
mon law adaptable to the exigencies, customs, and 
usages of the people of our various States, as 
applicable under the6Darticular governmental prac-tices of each State. U 
In still stronger language he maintains the court has gone 
beyond its range of judicial action: 
I denounce the contention of the court that 
these legislative limitations on the doctrine of 
59Molitor v. Ka.neland Community Unit District No •. 302, 
182 N.Eo (2d) 145 (Illinois, 1962). 
60ibido 
governmental immunity are a justification for its 
abolition by judicial fiato The legislature, in 
restricting the scope of such immunity, is acting 
in its area of special competenceo This court in 
abolishing it, has unwisely ventured beyond the 
range of judicial actiono61 
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Davis deplores the majority decision and predicts that 
it will release a flood of litigation in order to establish 
new boundaries in this area of liabilityo He also shares 
the feeling of many persons that the efficiency of the 
schools might be impaired by harassmento 
A rather unique approach to this question of whether 
the power to abolish governmental immunity lies with the 
courts or exclusively with.the legislatures has been taken 
by the Delaware Supreme Court.62 The court stated that 
because local u.nits of government are creatures of the state, 
their immunity against liability for negligence was derived 
from the state's sovereign immunity. The court then reasoned 
as follows: 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
sovereign immunity was a principle of the English 
common law; 
Delaware's first Constitution (like those of 
other.founding states) provided that the com-
mon law of.England should remain in force until 
altered by a future law of the State legisla-
ture; 
the immunity rule in Delaware was therefore not judicially created by the courts of that State, 
but by the State's Constitution; 
the current State Constitution provides that 
suit against the state may be brought "accord-
ing to such regulation as shall be made by 
law", ioeo, a law of the legislature; 
6l1bid. 
62shellhorn.and Hill, Inc. Y.• State, 187 A (2d) 71 (Delaware, 1964) .- - ·-
5) the doctrine of sovereign immunity is a part of 
the basic law of this State which may be waived 
solely by law enacted by the legislature.63 
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The court went on to state that the result "may be un-
wise as a matter of policy1164 and suggested to the legisla-
ture for its consideration the desirability of permitting 
suits, to some extent against the state for injuries caused 
by the torts of State employees. 
In an Arizona case against the State Highway Commission 
for wrongful death resulting from a highway accident, the 
court abolished the rule of governmental immunity from tort 
liability in Arizona not only for·the instant case, but for 
all pending cases and those not yet filed which are not 
barred by the statute of limitations, and all future causes 
of action. All prior decisions to the contrary were over-
ruled.65 
In so holding, the court reviewed the history of the 
rule of governmental immunity and referred to its limitations 
or abrogation in many states, and to precedent in Arizona 
that school districts had governmental immunity. The rule 
would appear to include school districts as governmental 
sub= div is ions. 
In a decision rendered on December 14th, 1962, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court also prospectively overruled 
63Ibid. 
64rbid. 
65stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 381 .P. (2d) 107 (Arizona, 196°!) • 
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governmental immunity as a defense in actions against all 
governmental entities, except the state itself, arising out 
of torts committed after the 1963 legislature adjourned.66 
However, the 1963 legislature restored the.governmental im-
munity rule in actions against school districts, but provided 
that when a school district procures liability insurance, it 
becomes subject to the statutory provisions relating to tort 
liability to the extent of the coverage obtained. 
The Colorado Supreme Court in 1963 upheld the rule of 
government immunity, adhering to the view that it was the 
function of the legislature and not the judiciary to change 
the ruleo In this case, a high school student sued to 
recover damages for injuries sustained while practicing 
basketball.67 It is interesting to note that while govern• 
mental immunity was upheld, three judges dissented, calling 
governmental immunity an anchronism today. 
A suit against the city of Milwaukee concerns the ab~o-
gation of governmental immunity of all government units in 
Wisconsin, including school districts.68 The court reversed 
its previous opinions that such abrogation of the rule was 
within the province of the legislature only. Since the rule 
had judicial origins, the court felt empowered to overrule 
66s}anel v •. Mounds_ View_ School District No._ 621, 118 
N.W. (2d 795 TMinnesota-;-I'9'6Z). · · · ~ ~ 
67Tesone_y. School_District !i£• _RE-2_inthe _County.of 
Boulder, 384· P. (2d) 82 (Colorado, 19o!). 
68Holgtz v. City_.2£._Milwaukee, 115 N.W. (2d) 618 (Wis-
consin, 19 2)~-
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it. The opinion stated that "henceforward, so far as govern ... 
mental responsibility for torts is concerned, the rule is 
liability- ... the exception is immunity. 1169 In determining 
tort liability of a municipality, the court stated it was no 
longer necessary to divide its operations into those which 
are proprietary and those which are governmental. As in the 
case of Minnesota, the state itself cannot be used. 
The Supreme Court of Oregon in the Vendrell case reached 
the opposite decision handed down by the Wisconsin Court.70 
In this case, a former high school student sued for dam.ages 
resulting from a tackle in a football game. One issue before 
the court was whether a provision allowing districts to buy 
liability insurance could be interpreted as impliedly waiving 
the sovereign immuriity of the school district from tort lia-
bility to the extent of the coverage of the insurance policy. 
Although expressing its dissatisfaction with the governmental 
immunity doctrine, the court stated it could not be abro-
gated by judicial decision in view of a state constitutional 
provision that this dq·ctrine protecting the state and its 
political sub-divisions, including school districts, from 
tort liability, could be changed only by action of the legis-
lature. The court interpreted the statute authorizing lia-
bility insurance as a legislative declaration of abandoning 
immunity only to the extent of the insurance. School dis-
tricts which do not purchase liability insurance are immune. 
691bid. 
70vendrell _v. School. District _No •. 26C. Molheur. County, 
360 P. (2d) 282 "(Oregon, 1961). · · 
Present Status of the Governmental Immunity 
Doctrine--Research Studies 
41 
In an attempt to clarify the somewhat cloudy picture of 
governmental immunity from tort liability, several studies 
have been completed in recent years. Cleetwood, in 1959, 
made a study of the legal liability of public schools in a 
program of interscholastic athletics. He found that the 
courts in general view interscholastic athletics as an inte-
gral part of the school program.71 The public schools are 
not regarded as insurers of the participants in, or specta-
tors of athletic contests even though incidental fees are 
charged. 
Another.study by Schaerer, completed in the same year, 
was concerned with the liability status of Indiana Public 
Schools. In his background material, Schaerer classified the 
tort liability of pµblic schools under state laws as: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Ultra'.""libera.l, where immunitY has, been; wa..iveq.," 
Ultra-conservative, where immunity is upheld 
and purchase of liability insurance is pro-
hibited; and 
A compromise position, where immunity is upheld 
but liability insurance is permitted. · 
He classified Indiana in the latter category and concluded 
that in general, schools are moving to the liberal pos,it;icin. 72 · 
71cleet C. Cleetwood, "Legal Liability for Injuries Sus-
tained in a Public School Program of Interscholastic Athlet= 
ics" (unpub. Doctoral dissertation; Duke University, 1959). 
72Robert W. Schaerer, "The Liability Status of Indiana 
Public Schools" (unpub. Doctoral· dissertation, University of 
Indiana, 1959). 
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A study by Fisher, in 1963, analyzed the patterns of 
liability decisions in the states of Texas, New Mexico, 
Arizona, and Oklahoma. He recommends that the state legis~ 
latures abolish governmental immunity and make the purchas-
ing of liability insurance mandatory by the school 
districtso 73 . 
Another doctoral study by Hartman also recommends that 
the state legislatures abolish governmental immunity. He 
believes a separate agency should be established to hear 
all tort claims below state levelo74 The study was princi-
pally devoted to liability in Illinois but also included 
New York, California, Minnesota, Oregon, and Washington. 
A study by Kigin, later developed into a book published 
in 1963, is concerned with teacher liability in school shop 
accidents. The author suggests a pupil compensation plan on 
a state=wide compulsory basis be established to protect the 
pupils. His proposal is similar to the present ·social 
security system with the state department of education act-
ing as self-insurer for the local districts. He also recom-
lmends mandatory save harmless statutes by the state 
legislatures.75 
73Leslie R. Fisher, "An Analysis of Patterns of Liabil-
ity Decisions in· the Public Schools of Selected States of 
the United States" (unpub. Ed.D. dissertation, University of 
Oklahoma, 1963). 
74Robert D. Hartman "The Nonimmunity of School Dis-
tricts to Tort Liabilityfi (unpub. Doctoral dissertation, 
University of Illinois, 1963). 
75Denis J. Kigin, Teacher.Liability in School-Shop 
,Accidents (Ann Arbor, Michigan, l963). ........ 
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A very recent study by McClanahan checked the tort lia-
bility of school districts in Oklahoma, Kansas, and Illinois. 
He criticizes the doctrine of governmental immunity but says 
that if it were changed "there would be a deluge of suits 
that would harass the school district and prevent its carry-
ing out its prescribed duties. 1176 He further states that 
"the.doctrine is eroded by court action and legislation" and 
that "one-fourth of the states now have at least limited 
waiver of the doctrine."77 The author recommends legislation 
requiring school districts to carry comprehensive liability 
insurance against suits in tort. He feels the school dis-
trict should be held fully accountable for its acts, regard-
less of governmental or proprietary function. 
The foregoing studies focus on the modification of the 
immunity doctrine and the effect on the school district. 
The present study will attempt to pinpoint the implications 
of the modifications for school personnel. 
76winfred. LyleMcClanahan,·"Trends Reflected in the 
Investigation of Bodily Injury Liability of Public School 
Districts in Selected State School Systems.'' (unpub.: Doctoral. 
dissertation, O. s. U.,· 1966)~ p. 179. 
77 Ibid., p. ·. 180. 
Ca.APTER III 
TORT LIABILITY OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES 
Tort Liability in General 
A tort may be thought of as an act or omission which 
violates the private rights of an individual and for which 
the appropriate remedy is a comm.on-law action for damages. 
Generally, torts are predicated upon or grow out of negli .. 
gence. 
In general, the courts are in agreement that a school 
district as an arm or agency of the state is inunune from 
liability for tort in the absence of statute to the con-
tra.ry.1,2 Despite the fact that Illinois, in 1959, and to 
a limited extent Minnesota and Wisconsin later have abroga-
ted the doctrine of tort immunity for school districts, 
there has been no widespread rush by the courts of other 
jurisdictions to follow suit.3 With a few exceptions such 
as maintaining a nuisance, the general rule in those states 
lcampbell .Y.· _Pack, 389 P. (2d) 464 (Utah, 1964). 
2consolidated School District .Y.· Wright, 261 P. 953 (Oklahoma, 1927) . · 
3Garber, Yearbook of School Law (1965). 
. . -- .__,_ 
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not abrogating immunity by judicial or statutory means is 
that liability does not accrue to the district itself. 
45 
The immunity that cloaks a school district under the 
common law is no shield to individual school officials and 
employees whose actions are found to be negligent.4 Reutter 
summarizes the status-of ·school board members as ~ollows: 
It is relatively rare that a school board mem~ 
ber is held individually liable for negligence. 
Partly this is due to the fact that·most acts of 
school board members are not the direct cause of 
injuries. Furthermore, because the school board 
has power to act only as a corporate unit, the acm 
tions of board members as individuals are limited. 
Also, under the common law public officers are not 
responsible for damages resulting from mere mis-
takes in judgment when.they have acted with good 
intentions. If such were not the situation, it 
would be very difficult to get people to aceept 
public office, particularly an unpaid office such 
as that of school board member.S 
However," if a board member does. not act honestly and in good 
faith, he is not protected from respQnsibility for his 
actions. If it can be shown that the board members have 
acted with gross negligence or with intent to deviate from 
statutory procedure, they may be held personally liable for 
their actions .. 
Although the posi.tion of public school teacher has 
many of the characteristics of public office holding, the 
courts have been almost unanimous in classifying them as 
employees rather than as officers. Garber, in referring to 
·4E. Edmund Jr. Reutter, Schools.and the.Law (New York, 
1960). . - - .._ 
5 Ibid. , p • 7 3 • 
teachers, says "they are governed by laws applicable to 
employees and not officers with the result that their lia= 
bility is not the same as that of school officers, 
necessarily.116 
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Gauerke feels the "immunity" rule has lent "moral sup .. 
port" if nin)t actual legal protection to teachers in their 
relati(onships with pupils. He says "a .teacher has felt 
shielded from possible court action because the school dis .. 
tri(ct c.ould not be called into court to answer for a tort. 117 
'Ihe courts a.re in agreement that the teacher stands. in 
l_oco. parentis with respec.t to the pupil during the time he 
is under the ju·risdiction of the school. Liability of a 
teacher, in the event of an injury, is real in spite of this 
protectiono A teacher needs competent legal counsel when 
faie:ed with a suit. Professio·nal employees of the boarrd such. 
as superintende·nts, principals and teachers have the author"' 
ity to govern pupils under their direction. They may enforce 
all rules made by the board and in the absence of such rules 51 
they may formulate those rules needed as long as they are 
reasonable. In enforcing these rules, it is generally held 
that employees are not liable if these rules are adminis-
tered in a reasonable manner. A teacher may be held liable 
if he is actuated by malice, or if he causes a permanent 
injury to the child. 
6carber, Handbook of School Law (1954), p. 89. 
-~ ~
7warren E. Gauerke, Legal and Ethical Responsibilities 
of School Personnel (Englewood Clifrs, New Jersey, 1959), 
p. 263. 
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Nolte and Linn, writing about the question of supervi-
sion, say: 
Pa.rents have entrusted their children to the 
public schools for instructional purposes as the 
compulsory laws direct. The law anticipates that 
the children will be protected and their best 
interests looked after by those in charge. Some~ 
times children are injured at school; the question 
then becomes is the teacher liable? The adequacy 
of teacher supervision is not always easy to 
determine.8 
A teacher may not assume that the mere fact that "it 
was a.n accident'v will absolve him of a charge of negligence. 
Where a known hazard exists, the teacher has the duty of 
forseeing the danger, and preventing an accident before it 
occurs. 
The teacher is not expected to exercise extraordi-
nary or unremitting supervision; he cannot contin-
uously keep under his eye all the students in his 
care, and sometimes accidents occur when9the teach~ 
er is looking in the opposite direction. 
Teachers will do well to minimize the number of times 
they must be absent from their posts, inasmuch as such 
absences may amount legally to failure to provide adequate 
supervision. There should be supervision for all aspects of 
activity during the time the child is on the school grounds. 
This of course includes recess and lunch periods. 
When the child is under the care of school authorities, 
the law requires that these authorities act in a reasonably 
8Nolte and Linn, p. 247. 
9Ibid. 
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prudent manner under the circumstances~lO The standard of 
care varies with the maturity of the child and the nature of 
the activity in which the child is engaged. 
Teachers and other professional personnel are held 
legally to a standard of care according to their profes-
sional training. The question for the courts to decide is 
not what a reasonably prudent person would do but what a 
reasonably prudent teacher would do. As mentioned earlier, 
foreseeability is often the key element. For a teacher to 
be liable for injuries to a pupil, the latter must not have 
contributed to his own injury. The child assumes normal 
risks in football and other strenuous sports. Negligence 
constitutes a question of fact to be determined by the court 
in each individual case. 
Oklahoma Tort Liability 
The general rule in Oklahoma is that a school district 
or school board is not subject to liability for injuries to 
pupils of public schools suffered in connection with their 
attendance at such school, since the district or board, in 
maintaining a school, acts as an agent of the state, and 
performs a purely public or governmental function or duty, 
imposed upon it by law for the benefit of the public, for 
which it receives no profit or advantage. 
The Supreme Court in 1927, in the Wright case, said: 
1
~orris_y. Douglas County School_District No. 9, 
403 P. (2d) 775 (Oregon, 1965). · · - -
Those who are carrying out the plan adopted 
_for our free school system a.rid especially those who 
are devoting time and attention~-.without compensa-
tion, to making the same· effective, are entitled to 
know whether or not they are to be held liable in 
·actions for negligence, or whether they are pro-
tected in performing governmental functions.of the. 
state in the same manner that the state itself 
would be protected, where they act in good faith 
without malice,·without compensation, and solely 
for the public good and after a most careful con..; 
· · sideration:; we. are led to hold that they -should be· 
so protected, in the absence of a positive statute · · 
.of ourlaW1J1aking power indicating a wish to the 
contrary~ 11 · •· · .. 
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The Supreme Court in a .much. later case involving lunch· 
· hour supervision upheld the decision. of ·the-trial court.when 
it stated that~ 
· • • . a school board in, discharge of its dut.ies is 
performing a mandatory governmental function and 
school dist·rict is not liable. for n.eglig_ent or 
·· tortious .acts of. its employees, and school district 
· was immune from liability for injury· sus.tained by a 
· · pupll when he. was a t~acked by two ~~her boys in a 
school gymnasium during noon· hour. . ·· ·. · 
·. The court noted that a direct appeal was being made to 
. . 
''recede from our previously announced rule which immunizes a 
municipal corporation, · such ?'s a school district, against 
. . . 
. . . . 
liability for torts of its agents or employee~. 1113· The 
. . . . . 
ieourt thus refused to follow the reasoning of the Illinois 
court14 and at this time it would seem that irrununity from 
tort liability is in effect with regard to Oklahoma schools .. 
llconsolidated School District Y..· Wright, 261 P. 953. 
(Oklahoma, 1927). 
12nahl y-,. Hughes,• 347 P •. (2d) 208 (Oklahoma, 1959). 
13Ibid •.. 
14Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District ~ •. 302, 
163 NoE. (2d) 89 (Illinois, 1959). 
Those districts authorized to furnish transportation 
are given the authority to purchase liability insuranceo 
The statute is a.s follows: 
The board of education of any school district 
authorized to furnish transportation ma.y purchase 
insurance for the purpose of paying damages to per-... 
sons sustaining injuries proximately caused by the 
operation of motor vehicles used in transporting 
school children. The operation of said vehicles by 
school district, however, is hereby declared to be 
a public governmental function, and no action for 
damages shall be brought against a school district 
under the provisions of this Section.but ma.y be 
brought against the insurer, and the amount of dam-
ages recoverable shall be limited in amount to that 
provided in the contract of i'l.1',surance between the 
district and the insurer and shall be collectible 
from said insurer only. The provisions of this 
Section shall not be construed as creating any lia-
bility whatever against any school district which 
does not provide said insurance.15 
This statute used the word "may" with regard to purchasing 
of liability a;nd is careful to emphasize that no liability 
exists in those schools refusing to purchase liability 
insurance. 
Tort Liability in Illinois 
50 
Illinois throughout most of its history has adhered to 
the doctrine of governmental immunity from tort liability 
and this doctrine has been applied to the schools by the 
courts~l6,17 In 1950, however, this doctrine was cracked 
15school_Laws of Oklahoma, 19650 
~-. ·~ 
16Leviton v. Board of Education, 30 N.E. (2d) 497 (Illinois, ~940J. · -
17Lindstrom_vo City.of Chicago, 162 N.E. 128 (Illinois, 
1928). . - - -
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by a decision in the Moore case as far as charitable insti= 
tutions protected by liability insurance was concerned.18 
In 1952 the rule recognizing the tort liability of charities 
protected by liability insurance was extended to apply to 
school districts iri the Broadlands caseol9 In this case the 
court held that the school district was liable in a.n action 
in tort since tlhe only justifiable reason for immunity of 
quasi-municipal corporations from" suit for tort is the pub• 
lie policy to prote.ct public funds and public property and 
t'hat where liability insur.anrce was available to protect the 
public funds, the reason for the rule of immunity vanished 
to the extent of the available insuranceo 
The Illinois legislature in an amendment to the school 
code in 1953 p,assed a statute which gave school districts 
the power to te&rry comprehensive liability policies to cover 
any loss or liability of the district or its agents, employ= 
ees~ teachers 9 or officersa20 The insurance company issuing 
such policy must waive any right to assert the defense that 
the school district is immune from suit as an agency of the 
state engaged in governmental functiono 
The previous cases and statutes were but forerunners of 
the complete break with the doctrine of governmental immunity 
handed down by the Illinois Supreme Court in the Molitor 
18Moore ;la Moyle, 92 N.E. (2d) 81 (Illinois, 1950). 
19Thomas_v. Broadlands Community Consolidated School 
District~ 109 l'LEa (2d) 636 (Illinois l) 1952). · 
20Illinois_Revised Statutes, .!22l, Chapter 122. 
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case.21,22 This case, involving a bus accident will be dis-
cussed more fully ,in the Transportation Section which follows.,. 
The court rejeicted all reasons in favor of the immunity doc-
trine as being contt~ry to the American theory of government 
and had no rightful place in modern society. Drechsler, in 
the Almerican Law Reports, feels the particular significance 
of the Molitor case~ 
• o • lies not only in the fact that it abolishes 
school district immunity from tort liability in the 
state of Illinois but that the abrogation of the 
rule is effected by the court and not the le.gisla-
ture, thus giving the case a potential effect as 
persuasive authority outside its own jurisdiction.23 
The Illinois legislature passed a bill limiting recov-
eries against public and nonprofit private schools to $10,000 
for each separate cause of action.24 
In the Bergman ~· Board .2£, Education case .. the. Illinois . 
court stated that the rule of the Molitor case .. doesnot apply 
to actions against. a· school· district: . for· injuries sustained , 
after the date of the original opinion but before the opin-
ion on rehearing was rendered, which limited the application 
of the rule to ca.ses arising out of future occurrences.25 
21Molitor v. I<aneland Community Unit District No. 302, 
163 N.E. (2d) 89 (Illinois, 1959). 
22Molitorvo Kaneland Community Unit District .No. 302, 
182 N.E. (2d) lqS (Illinois, 1962). 
23American Law Reports (annotated 2d, 86 [San Francisco, 
1962)) 0 . - . 
24Illinois Revised Statutes, 1959, Chapter 122, pp. 821-
831. 
25Bert;]n v. Board of Education, 173 N.E. (2d) (Illinois, 1 61Jo 
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California Tort Liability 
The tort liability of public schools in California has 
its basis in the various statutory provisions of state law. 
There are provisions in the California Education Code mak-
ing school boards liable for the negligence of officers and 
employeese26 
The California Public Liability Act provides that school 
districts, as well as other sub=divisions of state govern-
mentj are liable for injuries to persons and property result• 
ing from the dangerous or defective condition of public 
streets, highways, buildings, grounds, works and property in 
all cases where the governing board, officer or person having 
authority to remedy such condition, has knowledge or notice 
of the defective or dangerous condition and fails or neglects, 
for a reasonable time after acquiring such knowledge or 
receiving such notice, to remedy the condition or to take 
such action as may be reasonably necessary to. protect the 
public against the dangerous or defective condition.27 
In another statutory p~ovision, the Vehicle Code, the 
school district is responsible for negligence in the opera-
tion of a motor vehicle owned by it and operated by an offi~ 
cer, agent, or employee acting within the scope of his 
. office, agency or employmento28 
26california.Education_Code, Section 903 • 
............,.. 
27california Government Code, Section 53050-53051. 
--""'---~~----
28california _Vehicle~' Section 17150. 
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The California Education Code provides that the govern-
ing board of a school district is liable in the name of the 
district for any judgment against the district on account of 
injury to person or property arising because of the negli-
gence of the distric.tll its officers, or employees, in any 
case where a verified claim for damages has been properly 
presented .. 29 
The statute has been construed as providing authoriz.a-
tion to sue a school district for injuries arising from 
negligence of its ~gents as well as its officers or employ-
ees,30 In justifying its position the court used these 
words: 
.Although the statute mentions only the "district, 
or its officers or employees" and does not spe-
cifically mention agents, a reasonable construc-
tion of the statute would seem to be that it 
intends to impose liability on the school.district 
also for the acts of its agents, especially in view 
of the statutory rule that the code provisions 
should be liberally construed, with a view to effect 
its objects and to promote justice.31 
Tort Liability in New York 
There are a number of statutes in the state of New York 
affecting th~ tort liability of the state and other govern-
mental agencies or authorities with respect to public 
schoolso 
29california Education Code, Section 903. 
(2d) 
30Grover _Vo .. .fu!!!. Mateo. Junior_ College District, 303 P. 
602. (Calirornia, 1956). · . 
31Ibido 
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The Court of Claims Act waives the state's immunity 
from tort liability, and the statute has been held as also 
abrogating the immunity of other political subdivisions 
including schools.32 In addition, the New York Legislature, 
in statutes relating only to the schools, has prescribed 
specifically that boards o:I: education shall "save harmless" 
teachers, supervisors, officers, or employees from damages 
. 
. 
arising out of negligence resulting in personal injury or 
property dama.ge.33 ThesQ so=called "save harmless" statutes 
have been discussed in gl,"«:iater detail in earlier sections of 
this study. 
One section of the New York Education Law affects 
schools and districts where the population exceeds one milm 
lion, one se9:tion is applicable to cities having a population 
of 400,000 or more, and the others cover all other districts. 
In the section affecting New York City, (the only city over 
one ~illion) there is a direct liability provision. In the 
section pertaining to the other areas it is provided that 
district boards can arrange for insurance or can act as self-
insurers. 
Court cases are also controlled by other statutes in. 
which regulations are effected about school equipment, cur• 
riculum, and personnel leaving little discretion to board 
members. 
32NewYork Court of Claims_Act, Section 8, Chapter 860. 
:--- -~- ~
33New York Education~' Sections 2560-2562, 3023~3024. 
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The status of tort liability in New York may be clarim 
fied by citing a few recent cases invo·l;ving schools and 
school personnel. In one case dealing with the governmental-
proprietary distinction the cou.rit, stated that under the com• 
mon law the state and rqUnicipal corporations were subject to 
liability when exercising corporate or proprietary functions 
but immune.from liability when exercising governmental func• 
tions. I.t further stated tha.t the operation of a public 
school system is a governmental function and includes the 
maintenance of playgrounds and of athletic and manual train-
ing equipment used in connection therewith, and that the 
present rule rendering the state and its municipal adjuncts 
liable in negligence in the same manner as individuals or 
corporations is statutory in origin.34 
The court in Ohman .X:.• Board .2£. Education held that the 
Board of Education in New York City was liable for the 
negligence of a school teacher under the provisions of the 
applicable New York Statute.35 Judge Conway, in a dissent= 
ing opinion, concluded that the high standard of supervision 
and care in the crowded schools of New York City should be 
imposed upon principals and teachers.36 
34Brown v. Board of Trustees, 104 N.E. (2d) 866 (New 
York, 195~). ·- · ·- · · 
35New~_Educatiort ~' Section '2510. 
36orunan y. Board.of Education_of.Citv of-~-~' 90 
· N .. E. (2d) 474 (New York, l949). . · 
CHAPTER IV 
TORT LIABILITY IN SELECTED ASPECTS 
OF THE SCHOOL PROGRAM 
Transportation 
Probably no other phase of the educational program is 
as fraught with danger as the transporting of pupils to and 
from school. Increasing numbers of pupils and increasing 
. j"' 
motor vehicle traffic combine· to make public school trans-
portation a fertile field for litigation. Damage suits 
involving the driver, d;i..strict, board, or administration are 
quite common. 
The furnishing of free transportation is generally con-
sidered a governmental rather than a proprietary function.! 
It is furthering the educational program o~ the state, and 
in the absence of legislative enactments or judicial fiat to 
the contrary, it is -the general rule ·that school.districts 
and school boards are not liable for personal injuries or 
deaths of·pupils sustl;lined in connection with transportation.2 
lconsolidated School District ~- _Wright, 261 P ~ 953 (Oklahoma, 1927) •. · · . 
~Thurman v. Consolidated School District,. D. C. Kan. 
94 F. Suppo 610 (Oklahoma, l950). 
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Statutes authorizing boards of education or school 
districts to provide insurance against the negligence of 
drivers of their busses and the fact .that they do carry such 
insurance does not.change the conunon ... la.w,.immunity of the 
board or district from lia.bi~ity for negligence in the oper-
ation of school busses for school purposes. The general 
topic of liability insurance has been,.discussed in. the',.:pre-
ced:i,ng chapter~ .. 
Regardless of whether or not school districts a.re lia-
ble for torts committed in the operation of motor vehicles 
or in the transportation of pupils generally, drivers and 
operators of school busses whether acting a.s employees of 
the district or as independent contractors, are as a rule 
held liable for injuries resulting from their negligence in 
the course of transportation of pupils.3 The driver cannot 
escape liability on the grounds of governmental .function. 
"' 
The precise precautions which an operator or driver of a 
school bus must take in order to satisfy the requirement of 
due .. care will necessarily depend on.the circumstances of the 
caseo The driver is ordinarily under duty to deposit the 
school children riding in his bus at a reasonably safe place 
for alighting and crossing the street or road, and this duty 
continues until the child is safely off the highway q,;4 The 
,J.:i 
bus driver occupies a.different relation to the student than 
3Tipton y_. Willey, 191 N.E. 804 (Ohio, 1934). 
4Ibid. 
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does the common carrier to its passenger.· In the latter, it 
is voluntary, but on a school bus it is compulsory to attend 
school and if no other means of getting thebe are available, 
one must ride the bus~ As a child~ he has the natural right 
to parental control and protection while at home and has 
this same right going to and from :school. There is no rea-
son~ however, why the immunity enjoyed by the board of edu-
cation should attach to the driver, who as a private 
individual, undertakes for hire to safely transport the 
child to the school grounds. It is not questioned that he 
may be liable for his negligence, the only question being 
whether be was negligent. In order to recover against the 
owp.er or operator of a school bus on the grounds of negli-
gence, all the essential elements of actionable negligence 
must be present and the driver's negligence must have been 
the proximate cause of the injury. 
A driver's supervision does not end when the pupils 
alight from the bus. In a California case two school chil-
dren were struck by a city passenger bus after leaving a 
school buso The court held that the driver was negligent 
because he surveyed traffic only once before authorizing the 
children to cross the street before it was safe to do so, 
even though the city bus would have been clearly visible in 
his rearview mirror according to the courto5 
Sporter Vo Bakersfield and Ko Eo Ro Coo, 225 P. (2d) 
223 (California, 1950). ~-. -
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A somewhat similar case in Oklahoma· involving liability 
insurance was decided in the same manner by the Oklahoma 
court.6 This case involved an injury to a child who, on 
being allowed to alight from a school bus, walked around in 
front of _it and was struck.by a.passing truck. Even though 
the bus was not actually being operated at this time, the 
court held the accident·tobe within the coverage of the 
liability insurance policy providing for the "payment. of 
damages for bodily injuries,.including death at any time 
resulting therefrom, sustained by any person or persons; 
caused by accident.arising out of the ownership, maintenance 
or use of the bus. 117 
At least in New York, the .courts have held that the· 
school district must provide supervision of the pupils while 
they are. awaiting the school busses on the school grounds. 
In the Barth case in 1951, the court held the district neg-
ligent in failing to provide supervision when a school bus 
backed upon school property and killed a·twelve-year-old 
boy.8 
Governmental immunity from,tort liability appears to 
have-been settled in Oklahoma· to· the present time-by the 
6Ibid., p. 223. 
7Earl W. Baker & Co.~· Lagaly, 144 F. (2d) 344 (Oklahoma, T944). - -
8Barth v. Central School District, 102 N,Y.S. (2d) 263 
(New York, 1951). 
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Wright case decided in 1927 .. and involving transportation. 9 
In this case, the plaintiff through her father alleged the 
bus driver was an inexperienced and incompetent driver; that 
the defendants, the school district and the individual mem-
bers were negligent, in that they knew or should have.known 
that the driver was incompetent and inexperienced, and that 
he had had a number of accidents, and that he was·an unsuit-
able and improper person to have charge of the transportation 
of pupils, The court set forth the following questions · to. 
. C oris ider ~ 
1. 
2. 
Are school districts ·in Oklahoma liable in tort? 
Are the members of the school board liable in 
. tort as indi:vidU:als for an act done by them as 
a board? 
3. Is transportation a proprietary function rather 
than a governmental one?lO 
The court held in the negat.ive on all three questions 
and apparently set an immunity pattern followed 'to the pres-
ent time. A federal case in 1951, involving an Oklahoma 
school· district, was als.o co-nc·erned with the· immunity doc-
trine. The senior .clas·s ·was being transported on a senior 
trip in a district-owned school bus and was .involved in an 
accident.in Kansas. The court, holding that the district 
could asse.rt its immunity said: 
it would be anomalous ·to say ·the least, if .a 
school district which cannot.be required to pay dam-
ages when legally transporting its children'to 
·9consolidated School Dis.trictv. Wright,.261 P. 953 
(Oklahoma, 1927). 
lOrbid. 
school could be subjected to · s.uch damages because 
its board permitted such bus to be used in an il-
legal out-of-state excursion.11 
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It is the general view of the courts that the furnish-
ing of transportation by school.districts is not mandatory. 
A California case will serve as an example of this line o.f 
thinking.12 A nine-year-old pupil was killed when struck.by 
an automobile while crossing a busy street on his way home 
from school. The parents contended the district was .negli-
gent in permitting a chi.ld to enroll in a school so located 
as to require him to cross a heavily traveled stree,t. The 
court held that this would have :been a remote rather than a 
proximate cause of the pupil's death. In another California 
casejl3 a six-year-old student became ill while attending 
school and the school authorities directed his eleven-year-
old brother, who was also a student at the school but who 
was absent due·to illness, to·come·to ,the school and take 
his ,brother home. The boy received inj.uries when the bicycle 
on which he,and his younger brother were.riding tipped over 
and the parents .sued the school district on the grounds that 
it had a duty either to prbvide·transportation or to super-
vise the manner in which the two children went home. The 
court. held that the district was not liable on either count • 
. · llThurman v. Consolidated School District, D. C. Kan. 
94 F. Supp. 616-(0klahoma, 1950)~ 
12Girard v. Monrovia City School District, 264 P. (2d.) 
115 (California, 1953). 
l~KE;rwin v. San Mateo County, 1 Cal. Rptr. 437 (Cali-
fornia,' 1959h-
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Transportation Involving the Classroom Teacher 
Transportation accidents may involve the classroom 
teacher. Frequently teachers use their private cars to trans-
port pupils to athletic contests, music festivals and similar 
meetings. In court action involving pupil injury under such 
conditions, the courts have consistently ruled that the 
teacher may be held liable for damages while transporting 
school pupils~ even though the trip is a regular part of the 
teacher 1 s duties. 14 Hamilton says "this practice involved 
so many legal dangers as to be almost frightening. 1115 Some 
states have so-ca.lled."guest-statutes." These laws, in 
general, provide that persons riding in a car as .guests, 
that is without paying, may not recover from·the driver 
except·in cases of gross ·negligence. Hamilton points out 
· that the situation becomes much more involved if thos.e rid-
ing with the teacher pay him for the privilege of riding in 
the car. 
The mere sharing of expenses with the teacher 
has been said to be compensation to the teacher, 
and .the teacher is held to have been transporting 
persons for hire. The common type of automobile 
liability policy which protects the owner and/or 
driver of the auto from damage suits, usually con-
tains a provision that it does not protect the 
owner of the car if he is transporting passengers 
for hire~'· This means that if there are persons 
riding with the teacher, and either the riders of 
the school district so much as contribute to theii 
14Nolte and Linn, School Law for Teachers. 
15Hamilton, p. 40. 
cost of gasoline and oil for the trip, the owner 
may have no protection during that trip.16 
Frequently a number of teachers travel to a teacher's 
institute, workshop~ or other such meeting, in the auto of 
64 
one of the teachers, and agree to sh~.re the expenses of the 
trip. If each of the parties has equal control of the trip, 
they are said to.be joint venturers. Under such circumstan-
ces, each person riding in the car is equally .liable for 
damages or injuries caused by the negligent act of the 
driver of the car. 
Transportation and Judicial Abrogation 
The widely heralded Molitor case in Illinois, in 1959, 
signalled a radical departure from previous decisions con-
cerning tort liability.17 The Supreme Court of Illinois 
abruptly overthrew the doctrine of governmental immunity·as 
applied to school districts, in actions for tort damages. 
The facts of the case show that the plaintiff brought action 
against the school district fo.r personal injuries sustained 
when the school bus in which he was riding left the .road, 
allegedly as a result of :the driver's negligence, hit a cul-
vert, exploded, and burned. 
The court was faced with the highly important question: 
••• in the light of modern developments, should a 
school district be immune from liability for 
16 Ibid. 
17Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 
163 N. E. (2d) 89 (Illinois, 1959). ·· 
tortiously inflicted personal injury to a pupil 
thereof arising out of the operation of a school· 
bus owned and operated·by said district?l8 
All through the report of.the case there is eviderl.ce 
.that the court disregarded precedent for timeliness. In 
attaiqking the inununity rule based upon the medieval idea 
that "the king .can do no wrong" the Illinois Supreme Court 
' 
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emphasized·· that "in preserving tre sovereign immunity theory, 
courts have overlooked the fact that the Revolutionary War 
was fought to abolish that 'divine right of kings' in which 
the theory is based. 1119 
In answer to the contention that the old immunity rule 
was justified in its protection of public funds and property, 
the court said: 
We do not believe that in .this present day and 
age, when public education constitutes one of the 
biggest businesses in the country, school immunity 
can be justified on the.protectionmof-funds theory.20 
The defendant in the Molitor case contended that, if 
innnunity.is to be abolished, it should be done by the. legis-
lature and not the courts. To this contention the Supreme 
Court replied: 
The doctrine of scho.ol district immunity wc:1.s 
created by this court alone. Having found that 
doctrine to be unsound and unjust under present con~ 
ditions, we consider that we have not only the power, 
but the duty, to abolish that immunity. We closed 
our courtroom doors·withou211egislative help, and 
we can likewise open them •. 
18fbid. 
19rbid. 
ZOibid.· 
21 Ibid. 
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It was widely predicted that a host of other states 
would follow the lead of the Illinois Court, but at the pres-
ent time there has ·· been no indication of mass desertion of 
the immunity doctrine by the other states. It should be 
noted that the Illinois legislature quickly passed legisla-
tion limiting damages to $10,000 and limiting court action 
to cases after the Molitor case. 
Transportation Precautions for School Personnel 
There has been a definite increase in the number of 
states permitting or requiring school districts to purchase 
liability insurance. In most cases the legislatures care-
fully point out that no liability accrues in the districts 
that do not purchase liabil:lty insurance. 
Regardless of the immunity status of the district, cer-
tain precautions should be taken. The N. E. A. booklet, Who 
-is Liable, lists the following aids to school administrators 
to avoid or reduce school transportation accidents: 
Use of only safe and properly equipped vehicles. 
School buses should measure up at least to the min-
imum st~ndards and specifications set by the state 
department of education 
A regular check of the mechanical condition of the 
buses by qualified mechanics 
Employment of drivers who are competent, experienced, 
and·physically fit 
Regular and systematic instruction to bus drivers 
on driving and traffic regulations, particularly 
as they relate to school-buses 
Establishment.of a definite pattern for school bus 
drivers to use in approaching, loading, parking, 
and leaving the school grounds 
Adoption and enforcement of rules and regulations 
for supervising pupils during loading and unload-
ing 
Promotion of safe bus riding habits among pupil 
passengers 
Specific instructions to drivers to park in a safe 
place before discharging pupils and to caution 
pupils to use care in crossing streets and high-
ways after alighting from the school bus 
Establishment of definite and well-understood 
procedures and regulations to safeguard the bus 
and its passengers from accident whenever th~2bus is used for field and other non-route trips. 
Playground Supervision 
Most schools now in existence were built without ade-
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quate provision for playground activities. When we consider 
the crowded conditions usually present during playground 
activities, it is hardly surprising that a large number of 
accidents occur here. These accidents are more common at 
the elementary level where games are usually not organized 
and the children are more excitable. Another reason for a 
s::g'reater incidence of accidents at the elementary level is 
the use of many types of playground apparatus. 
Adequate supervision should be provided by the adminis= 
,trat:ion and such supervision should be appropriate for "the 
size and nature of the grounds, the play apparatus thereon, 
22Who is Liable for Pupil Injuries? NEA Research Divi~ 
sion, (Washington~ D. C~, 1963), p. 41. 
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and the number and ages of the children using the area.1t23 
It is not necessary or even possible to keep pupils under 
constant scrutiny at all times. The acts of pupils cannot 
always be anticipated and. the courts are aware of this. In 
the majority of cases, accidents are probably the fault of 
the individual involved. Nevertheless, failure to adequately 
supervise the activities of children is frequently alleged 
in court cases involving pupil injury and the classroom 
teacher supervising the activity is most frequently named as 
defendant. 
The school dist.rict should make rules and regulations 
for pupils' conduct so as to minimize playground dangers. A 
regular and systematic inspection of the playground area 
should be made by the principal and teachers. Broken equip-
ment or hazardous conditions should be corrected immediately. 
The courts decide each case on its merits but a few 
cases taken primarily from California and New York will illus-
trate a general viewpoint concerning supervision. The New 
York court held the teacher· not liable when a pupil fell off 
a horizontal ladder.24 The pupil was a first grade student 
at Farmingdale and the ladder was six feet above the ground. 
The court said "the evidence was insufficient to show that 
there was lack of adequate supervision or that the ladder was 
. ?3 
- . Ibid .• , p. 44. 
24Bennett v. Board of Education, 226 N.Y.S. (2d) 594 
(New York, 1962J. 
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unsuitable for children of the pupil's age. 1125 A similar 
case in California involving a fall from a horizontal ladder 
resulted in the death of the pupil.26 Action was brought by 
the parents charging the school district was negligent in 
not providing closer supervision. The court stated that 
"the statute requirins public school teacher to hold pupils 
to strict account for their conduct does not ma~e school 
district insurers of safety of pupils at play or·else~ 
where."27 The case was complicated by the fact that the 
deceased pupil suffered from a type of cerebral palsy and 
was subject to seizures. The mother had previously insisted 
to the teacher that the child could take care of himself and 
needed no special treatment. The court held the teacher and 
district not liable. 
Another California case resulted when·a pupil was pushed 
by a classmate and broke his front teeth in the subsequent 
fall. 28 Still another case involved the district and a pupil 
injured when he ran into a flagpole.29 In both cases the 
court said that every action of the pupils cannot be forseen 
25rbid., p. 594. 
26Rodri ues v. San Jose Unified School District, 322 P. 
(2d) 70 California, ~ssr:-
?.7 Ibid., p. 71. 
28woodsmall v. Mt. Diablo Unified School District, 10 
CaL Rptr. 447 (Calimrnia, 1961). . . . 
-291lza,h v. Orleans Elementar} _School of Rumbolt County, 
· 144 P. . 38'3 (California, ·1943 • · · 
and that teachers are not required to constantly have all 
pupils under their immediate scrutiny. 
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The line between adequate and inadequate supervision is 
thin and not clearcut. Neither the school district nor the 
teacher will be held liable where sup.ervision of playground 
activities is judged adequate and reasonable. In states 
such as California and New York where districts are not 
innnune from suits for tort liability, the districts may be 
held liable for not providing adequate supervision. 
A New York court held the district liable when a pupil 
suffered injuries after she jumped off backwards from a five-
foot bleacher in an unsupervised play area.30 The decision 
was 4 to 3 and Justice Burke, in a dissenting opinion, 
pointed out that the teacher was on duty about 1,000 feet 
away-and stated that the "reckless attempt by the plaintiff 
to accomplish this foolhardy feat (jumping off backward) was 
the proxi~te cause of the injury. 1131 He went on to state 
that even vigilant supervision could not anticipate the "un-
orthodox impulsive self-instigated act of the plaintiffo" In 
another New York case 32 the court held that the district's 
failure to enforce adequate play rules was negligent and 
awarded damages to the plaintiff when she ran into a ball 
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30necker v. Dundee School District 4, 167 N.Y.S. (2d) (New York,-1957). · 
31 Ibid. 
32Germond v. Board of Education, 197 N.Y.S. (2d) 548 
(New York,· 1960). - · 
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field and was struck by a bat swung by an older pupil. A 
school district in California was held responsible for the 
death of a ten-year-old boy who fell and struck his head on 
the pavement while involved in a game of "blackout. 1133 The 
court said there was substantial evidence from which the 
jury could find there was no teacher in the yard at the time 
of the ,,accident or for an appreciable period before it. 
Supervision was held to be adequate in another California 
case involving an inju~y in,a game of touch footbal1.34 The 
physical education teacher had warned the boys on previous 
, occasions not to play rough and had warned them again prior 
to the accident. The player was a voluntary participant 
injured by a larger opponent in a game played according to 
the rules. 
It would seem that districts will be held liable for 
injuries if playground apparatus is defective and the school 
officials are aware of it or have had time to become aware 
of it. If the equipment is not in a state of disrepair, 
damages are not usually allowed. Extra care must be taken 
at the elementary level since pupils of widely diverge~t ages 
and sizes may be tempted to use the playground equipment and 
apparatus. 
33TY!fkowicz y. San Jose Unified School District, 312 P. (2d) 388. California-;-:"T9~ -
34Pirkle v. Oakda,le Union Grannnar School District, 253 
p~ (2d) r·ccalifornia,. 195.:n • 
• 
. Playground Supervision After Hours 
In New York a school district may be held liable for 
.injuries sustained on the playground when the playgrounds 
are kept open for after-hours use.35 A fifteen-year-old boy 
on a Sunday morning entered a playground maintained by _the 
board of education and kept open to allow the public to use 
the facilities. While playing softball, he slipped on a 
.patch of ice and was injured. There was evidence to the 
effect that there were several such p~tches of ice and _the 
court held the district liable on the ground of negligence, 
s~ating that a playground can be kept·closed until the danger 
is. removed or disappears and that young boys playing ball in 
a playground cannot be expected to be watchful for danger-
ous areas. 
In a similar case involving a boy playing in an unsuper~ 
vised school yard after school hours, the New York court held 
that the district was not liable.36 The child was struck by 
a bicycle riqden by a playmate who was leavi~.· the school 
yard. Holding that the city board of education was not lia-
ble for the injury, the court said that this was not a case 
involving the necessity for supervision because of mainte~ 
nance or operation of some appliance furnished by the board 
of education, that there was nothing involved here but the 
~5streickler y. City of~ York, 225 N.Y.S. (2d) 602 
(New York, 1962). 
~6Diele v. Board of Educ~tion, 146 N.Y.S. (2d) 511 (New 
York, 1954). · -
natural dangers inherent in the play of children. It went 
on to state that where the board provided a place for play 
which would be safer than the public street, there should 
l 
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not be imposed upon it the burden of personal supervision of 
such play. 
The California Court reached a similar decision in a 
case involving injury to a six-year-old boy.37 The boy was 
injured when a large wooden box was pushed on him as he 
played in the school playground on a Sunday when the grounds 
were closed and the gates locked. It was held that the evi-
dence was insufficient as a ma~ter of law to support a find-
ing that the box was in a dangerous or defective condition 
so as to sanction recovery under the applicable California 
Public Liability Act rendering the school district liable 
for dangerous or defective conditions of which it had 
knowledge. 
It is clear from the cases discussed here that the 
courts are not in complete accord concerning the extent of 
supervision required on the playground after school hours. 
In a slight majority of cases reviewed, the courts have not 
held the schools responsible for negligence when injuries 
resulted {rom after-hours activity on the school grounds. 
37Novack v 0 Los An~eles School District, 206 P. (2d) 
403 (Californi~, 19"49)., 
Precautions for Reducing Playground Accidents 
The N, E. A. booklet Who.!! Liable lists some precau-
t.ions and suggestions for reducing playground accidents: 
Adequate and c.ompetent supervision is provided 
Use of play.area is scheduled to avoid 
crowding 
Older children are separated· from younger ones· 
Bicycle riding and other inherently dangerous 
activities in the play area are prohibited 
Rules and regulations are adopted for the con-
t.rol of pupil conduct on the playground 
Playg.round equipment and apparatus are of the 
types recognized as safe for the use of children, 
and are kept in good repair 
The playgr~:,und area is kept free of obstruc-
tions and rubbish 1;2iles and the surfaces. are pro-
perly maintained.3~ 
Gorporal Punishment 
The legislatures have generally been silent regarding 
the use of corporal punishment in disciplining a pupil, 
since the school's authority to use force springs from the 
power and duty and restraint vested by law in the parent. 
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In the great majority of states,. the legal right of a teacher 
to inflict reasonable corporal punishment is clear. He must 
use the proper instrument under the circumstances and is 
legally obliged to take into account the character of the 
offense, the sex,- age, size, and physical strength of the 
38Who .!! Liable for Pupil Injuries? p. 47. 
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pupil. All of the courts agree that a teacher will not be 
permitted to deal brutally with a pupil so as to endanger 
his life, limb or health,39 It becomes a question for the 
courts to decide in most cases whether the punishment was 
reasonable or excessive according to curren·t interpretation 
of these words. 
Corporal punishment is usually administered as a result 
of a violation of some rule or regulation set forth by the 
school officials.. Most rules and regulations governing 
student conduct are established by the local governing board 
and not at the state level. Some rules are set up in board 
policies,. some are set forth by the superintendent, princi ... 
pal or teacher and some are not even written but rather 
implied. These rules must be consistent with policies of 
the state board of education, state statutes, state consti-
tutions and with the federal constitution. In addition, they 
must be reasonable and designed to achieve proper ends.. The 
burden of proof is on the complaining party, the legal pre= 
sumption being that the rule is proper. 
It is possible that a reasonable rule can result in an 
unreasonable enforcement. The punishment must fit the 
offense and the penalty must be for a legitimate purpose. 
Reutter explains how most cases involving corporal punish= 
ment are decided~ 
Generally it may be said that local school 
authorities may make reasonable rules governing 
39Hamilton, Po 36. 
pupils designed for effective school management and 
may punish pupils for violation of such rules in a 
reasonable manner. Thus,, the overwhelming. number 
of cases hinge on whether the rule in question is 
one that is in the-power of school authorities to 
make,·· whether the method of enforcement is legally 
sound, or botb.40 
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There are at least three distinct types of legal action 
that may result from corporal punishment: 
L 
2. 
3. 
Criminal action for assault and battery brought 
by the state against. the teacher 
Civil action for assault and battery brought 
against the teacher by parents of the child 
Proceedings against. the teacher by the school 
board charging that the particular instance 
of corporal punishment constitutes incompe41 
· tency and therefore grounds for dismissal. 
Most suits instituted are c.ivil action cases by the 
parents against the teacher charging unreasonable punishment 
or enforcement of an unreasonable rule. Punishment may be 
either excessive or improper. Excessive punishment refers 
to· a situation where the punishment is proper but the extent 
of the punishment is questioned while improper punishment 
refers to a situation where the mode of punishment is 
questioned.-
Because of the special privilege accorded by law to the 
teacher, liability is not imposed in every case where a con-
viction would be required in the absence of this loco parentis 
standing. Except where prohibited by statute, the infliction 
of corporal punishment on a child for·disobedience or other 
misconduct does.not in itself constitute assault and battery. 
40Reutter, p. 63. 
4lrbid. 
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There are limits, of course:i to how far the punishment can 
go and here the courts are not in general agreement. The 
weight of opinion seems to be that one must not exceed the 
bounds of moderation, and must not be cruel or merciless. 
There is no disagreement that punishment inflicted with mal-
ice~ or causing permanent injury or death, exceeds the priv= 
ilege accorded by law to a teacher and renders such teacher 
criminally liable under the same circumstances as if the 
privilege of loco parentis did not exist. 
Two Iowa cases illustrate the general thinking of courts 
concerning excessive punishment. In both cases the teachers 
were convicted of assault and battery. In the Mizner case 
the teacher struck a 21-year-old female student about a dozen 
times with a whip, producing marks which remained for two 
months.42 In the Davis case, the teacher whipped a 14-year ... 
old female student with a stick, giving her 20 or 25 licks 
for her refusal to carry water from a neighboring well. The 
court held that the punishment was inflicted for an unwar .. 
ranted cause and in an immoderate degree.43 
A New York court set aside a teacher's conviction of 
assault in the third degree upon a 15-year-old male pupil. 44 
The teacher struck the pupil a number of times with a half-
inch rubber siphon hose for not having his English lesson. 
42statev. Mizner, 50 Iowa 145 (1853). 
43state v. Davis, 139 N. W. 1073 (Iowa, 1913). 
44Peop~v. Petrie, 198 N.Y.S. 81 (New York, 1923). 
The p·upil then attended all his other classes and returned 
to school next day. There was no evidence that there was 
any anger, malice or passion on the part of the defendant. 
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In a late:i:- New York case in 1944 the court reversed a 
conviction of a teacher of an assault in the third degree 
upon a ten-year-old male pupil, on the law and the facts, 
upon evidence that for infractions of disc.ipline in deliber-
ately throwing or dropping a book from the balcony of the 
auditorium to the seats below and injuring several pupils, 
the teacher struck him several times on the buttocks with a 
yardstick. The court held the punishment was moderate and 
no anger or malice was evidenced.45 
It has been specifically held in these New York cases 
that under New York statute, a teacher may, in the exercise 
of lawful authority to correct a pupil, use force or violence 
if it is reasonable in manner and moderate in degree. A 
teacher accused of assault on a pupil in the infliction of 
punishment for misconduct may show on the prior conduct of 
the pupil, in support of the position that the punishment 
conformed to the statute. 
The California court upheld the finding of the trial 
court of the guilt of a teacher in violating a statute penal-
izing any person who wilfully inflicts on any child "unjus-
tifiablel1 physical pain or mental suffering.46 Evidence 
45People v. Munnnert, 50 N.Y.S. (2d) 699 (New York, 1955). 
46People v. Curtiss, 300 P. 801 (California, 1931). 
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disclosed that in the punishment of a seven-year-old male 
pupil for fighting with another boy, the defendant whipped 
him with a wooden paddle about twenty inches long, three 
inches wide a.nd one=half inch thick, as he lay flat on his 
stomach on a table, striking him about thirty times. The 
court held the punishment was unreasonable under the circum~ 
stances. 
Physical Education and Athletics 
The organization of school athletics is generally con-
sidered to be an integral part of physical education and 
therefore it is the general rule that school districts or 
school boards in charge of public schools are immune from 
liability for injuries sustained in practice or games.47 
The same principle generally holds true with regard to spec .. 
taters, even if they are charged a fee for admission. A few 
states including the two sample states of California and 
New York have statutes making them liable to the same extent 
as private persons or corporations for torts in connection 
with matters pertaining to injuries in school athletics. The 
physical education teacher is obligated to exercise reason-
able care to prev13nt injuries and to assign pupils to such 
activities as are within their ability and to adequately 
supervise such activitieso 
47cleet C. Cleetwood, "Legal Liability for Injuries Sus= 
tained in a Public School Program of Interscholastic Athlet-
icsn (unpub. Doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1959). 
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A teacher in New York was held negligent in the La Val-
ley Cas.e when he allowed two pupils to engage in a dangerous 
exercise without adequate instruction.48 In this case, the 
defendant teacher directed two untrained pupils to box. three 
rounds of one minute each, with a minute of rest intervening. 
One pupil suffered a cerebral hemorrhage caused by a blow on 
the temple. It was shown that the teacher did not inform 
the pupils of the dangers of boxing nor did he instruct them 
on the principles of defense. The court held the teacher 
neglige.nt. 
Ordinarily a pupil who voluntarily takes part in the 
school's competitive sports program assumes the normal risks 
of the game for which he has been properly instructed. A 
California case in 1958 resulted in the largest judgment 
discovered in this study.49 A football player was injured 
and his injury was alleged to have been aggravated by the 
negligent way he was removed from the scene of the accident. 
The original award was for $325,000 but this amount was later 
reduced to $207,000 by the court. Extra-ordinary care must 
be used in handling or removing an injured player from the 
athletic field.· A doctor should be available at each game 
and where practical, at scrimmages too. 
· 48LaValley Y.· Stanford, 70 N. Y. S. (2d) 460 (New York, 
1947). . 
49welch v •.. Dunsmuir .. Joint .. Union. High . School District, 
326 P. (2d) 6'!3 (California, 1958). 
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A case in Washington, in 1965, illustrates the thinking 
of most state courts on spectator injuries. 50 In this case 
a 67-year=old grandmother of a football player was injured 
when struck by a player who was knocked outaof-bounds. No 
admission had been charged and the court said that one 
attending a football game sponsored by a school district 
which charged no admission had duty to protect herself not 
only against dangers of which she had actual knowledge but 
such dangers incident to the game as would be apparent to a 
reasonable person in exercise of due care. 
The school board was held liable under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior in a recent New York cas·e. 51 The school 
board and two teachers assigned as playground supervisors 
were sued for damages when a softball player was injured by 
falling over a bench. The jury found the supervisors had 
been negligent and that the board was liable for the negli• 
gence of its employees. Most courts in other states do not 
follow this line of reasoning. 
The physical education instructor or coach must period-
ically inspect his equipment and apparatus. Any defects 
should be promptly remedied or the defective material or 
equipment removedo Pure accidents occur in sports and phys-
ical education classes and if there is no negligence, then of 
course there is no liability. Extra caution must be used 
50Perry v. Seattle School District Noa 1, 405 P. (2d) 
589 (Washington, 1965) o . - . -
) 51Domino Vo Mercurio, 234 NeYoS. (2d) 1011 (New York, 1962 0 -
however since large numbers are the rule in these classes 
and greater bodily contact is almost inevitable. 
First Aid 
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Although minor first aid is administered on many occa-
sions by teachers and principals, the subject of first aid 
has been the basis of court action.52,53 When immediate 
first aid seems needed, the teacher is obligated by his rela-
tionship to the pupil to do the best he can." Failure to act 
may be a cause for court action, just as giving medical 
treatment may be a cause. Only the first aid knowledge 
expected of laymen is expected of teachers. It is generally 
agreed that there is a duty to render first aid in case of 
injury to a pupil but where the permissible limits are is 
not always clear. Medication should not be offered by a 
teacher and where possible, the teacher should await the 
arrival of a medically trained person. If an injury does not 
demand immediate attention, teachers should wait until after 
school or call the parents or family physician instead of 
providing treatment. Two teachers in Pennsylvania were held 
to be negligent when they held a pupil's infected hand in 
scalding water causing blisters and permanent disfigurement.54 
52Guerrie-ri y .. Tyson, 24 A. (2d) 1011 (New York, 1962). 
53welch.v. Dunsmuir Jo:.i.nt Union High School District, 
326 P. (2d) 653 (California, 1958). 
54Guerrieri v. Tyson, 24 A. (2q) 468 (Pennsylvania, 
1942). - -
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The court said that, "Though public school teacher stands in 
loco 2arentis to pupil and, under delegated parental author-
ity implied from relationship of 'teacher and pupil', may 
inflict reasonable corporal punishment on pupil to enforce 
discipline, there is no implied delegation of authority to 
exercise her lay judgment as a parent may in matter of treat-
ment of injury or disease suffered by pupil. 1155 The court 
went on to say that the teachers were not acting in an emer-
gency and neither of them had any medical training or 
experience a 
In a California case, a physical education coach was 
found to have acted negligently when he permitted an injured 
football player to be carried off the playing field without 
a stretcher.56 In another football injury case, the court 
found no negligence against the coaches when a teacher 
snapped a dislocated shoulder back into place, placed the 
boy's arm in a sling and sent him home.57 The court said 
there was an absence of a showing that there was an immediate 
pressing necessity for medical aid before the boy went home. 
In still another physical education case, a physical educa= 
tion teacher walked a boy a short distance to the supervisor's 
office after he broke his arm jumping over a gym horse.SB 
5Srbid. 
56welch v. Dunsmuir Joint Union High School District, 
326 P. (2d) 6~3 (California, 1958). ·· 
57nuda y. Gaines, 79 A.. (2d) 295 (New Jersey, 1951). 
58sayers y. Ranger, 83 A. (2d) 775 (New Jersey, 1951)0 
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First aid was given there and he was then taken to a hospi-
talo The parents thought the boy should not have been 
directed to walk to the office but the court stated that the 
steps taken to aid the injured boy were better than waiting 
for a doctor to come to school. 
Prior parental consent to administer first aid or treat• 
ment at school is sometimes requested from the home and kept 
in the principal's officeo This is probably a good practice 
although a teacher may still be found negligent even if 
prior permission to administer first aid is received. 
Classrooms and Shops 
Accidents frequently occur in the classrooms of our 
school.s. Usually.these accidents are not the fault of the 
teacher but teachers are vulnerable, especially in science 
and shop classes. While school shops and science rooms are 
potentially dangerous places, they can when properly 
equipped, arranged, and managed, provide a relatively safe 
environment in which youth and adults may work and learn. 
In addition to the normal responsibilities of the regular 
teacher, these instructors have the additional task of main-
taining a wide variety of .equipment and materials for safe 
and effective use. They must provide instruction in the 
safe use of tools, materials and equipment. These teachers 
especially need the facts about the legal aspects of acci-
dents and the extent ~nd conditions of liability.59 
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Adequate instruction, careful supervision, constant 
inspection and written rules are necessary if shop and sci-
ence teachers are to avoid litigation. Most of the cases 
selected for this study were from California or New York and 
while the list is not meant to be comprehensive, fifteen 
cases involving shop teachers alone were found from 1935 to 
the present timeo Many cases allege negligence in supervi-
sion. A New York case in 1946 resulted in the board being 
held liable for the negligence of the shop teacher when a 
pupil was injured while trying to extricate a piece of metal 
from a machine and another pupil stepped on the foot trea-
dle.60 Another New York case involved failure to provide 
protective equipment and resulted in the school district 
being held liable.61 A student crushed his thumb while try-
ing to free his sweater which was caught in a lathe and the 
court said the school district was under an obligation to 
furnish the same protective clothing to pupils in the machine 
shops that the New York Statute require industrial employers 
to furnish to their employees working on similar machines. 
59nenis J. Kigin, Teacher Liability in SchoolmShop Acci= 
dents (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1963), p. 7. -
60:oe Benedittis y. Board of Education .2!.· New York City, 
67 N.Y.S. (2d) (New York, 1946). . 
61Edkinsv. Board of Education of New York City, 41 N.E. (2d) 75 (New York, 1942J:" ·~ ~ ~ 
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A similar view was adopted by a California court in an action 
brought by a pupil who caught his fingers in a printing press 
that had no guard. 62 The court held that violations of 
safety regulations of the Division of Industrial Safety proa 
tecting employees was applicable to school districts and 
their violation is an act for which a board of education may 
be held liable. Even Oklahoma, where ordinarily no liability 
accrues, had similar legislation passed by the last session 
of its legislature. The section is as follows: 
Section 582 Safety Goggles•-School Board to Provide 
for Certain Personnel 
The school board of each school district in 
Oklahoma shall provide safety goggles as approved 
by the National Safety Council for all personnel 
using materials and machines that may damage the 
vision of such personnel because of flying parti-
cles, intense light, severe hea~3or other harmful 
effects. Approved May 3, 1965. 
Pupils frequently make knives or other weapons in shop 
classes if they are not closely supervised. A fifteen-year-
old boy sued the school district and his shop teacher for 
damages for injuries when a toy cannon he had made accidently 
was fired.64 His claim was based on the allegation that the 
shop teacher failed to warn him of the dangers involved in 
loading the cannon. The jury verdict was for the defendants 
in this case. 
6
~ehmann y_. ~Anfeles_City Board of Education, 316 
P. (2d) 55 {Califot"nia, 957). 
63school Laws of Oklahoma, 1965, p. 241. 
64calandri v. Ione Unified School.District, 33 Cal. 
Rptr. 333 (Californ"Ia:-1963). 
87 
Negligence on the part of a shop instructor was alleged 
when a pupil was killed and another injured as a result.of 
an explosiod caused by a third pupil. 65 One pupil had a 
welding torch and was attempting to cut a hole in an auto-
mobile frame that had an open gas tank attached to the frame. 
This pupil was not a member of the .defendant's class but the 
subsequent explosion killed one pupil and injured another 
pupil who were class members. The trial court ruled in favor 
of the defendant shop teacher but the judgment was reversed 
by the appeals court. Frequently the courts decide on negli-
gence according to the care exercised in preparing the pq.pils. 
In another California shop case resulting in injury to a 
pupil, the court held for the defendant shop teacher because 
it could be shown that precise instructions in using the 
machines had been given.66 Even though the youth sustained 
the loss of a finger in a jointer, the court felt no negli-
gence was exhibited by the teacher. 
'The federal government's financial backing of area voca-
tional schools and the pupil's interest in missiles, propel-
lants and other potentially dangerous devices and materials 
indicates that even greater care needs to be exercised by the 
shop and science teacher. Planning, careful preparation, and 
close supervision are essential ingredients of a safe 
65nutcher v. Ci¥y of Santa Rosa High School District, 
319 P. (2d) 14 Zcali ornia, 1957Y:--
66Klenzendorf Y.• Shasta Union High School District, 40 
P. (2d) 878 (California, 1935). 
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classroom. Independent study is generally acknowledged to 
be an important phase of the educational process, but danger 
lurks if an accident results from improperly supervised 
activities. Leaving the classroom unattended is always risky 
and may result in a lawsuit. Certainly chemicals and other 
dangerous materials should be kept under lock and key. 
Access to equipment should be carefully controlled and a 
student should never be left in charge of the discipline of 
the class. 
Libel 
As professional personnel, teachers and administrators 
are often requested to make official statements about other 
professional workers and pupils. These statements are qual-. 
ifiedly privileged and those making them are generally not 
liable in damages, even if the statements were false, pro .. 
vided they were made in good faith. Although only a few 
school~connected libel cases reach .the courts, two California 
cases merit some attention here. In Everett~· California 
Teachers Association, the Assistant Superintendent of Schools 
sued the California Teachers Association and twelve employees 
of its Connnission on Personnel Standards and Ethics, claim= 
ing damages by reason of a defamatory report. The report was 
an outgrowth of a study requested by the teacher association 
of a school district in California.67 The court held there 
67Everett v. California Teachers Association, 25 Cal. 
Rptr. 120 (Calirornia, 1965). 
was no legal wrong since "publications seeking to convey 
pertinent information to the public in matters of public 
interest come within the purview of 'privilege a which is a 
defense in a libel action." In the other California case, 
the court held that: 
.•• a Superintendent of a school district could 
not claim immunity insofar as he may have made de= 
£amatory statements concerning students to members 
of the general public if the statements were not 
merely reports of official action but instead pur-
ported to be statements of facts within his per-
sonal knowledge.6~ 
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The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in a 1963 case, ruled for 
the defendant superintendent in an action brought by a speech 
therapy teacher alleging defamatory statements.69 This is a 
rather typical case and will be discussed fully. The teach~ 
er, when applying for another position, gave the superintend~ 
entis name as a personal reference. When the prospective 
employer asked for comme·nts on the te.acher' s qualities and 
competence, the superintendent answered that he was unable 
to give the teacher an unqualified recommendation, stating 
that the six principals and the elementary co-ordinator unan~ 
imously recommended that he no longer be retained. The 
teacher contended that his professional reputation was 
libeled by this allegedly defamatory response. The superin-
tendent used the usual defenses that the statements were true 
or that they were conditionally privileged because they were 
68Elder v. Anderson, 23 Cal. Rptr. 48 (California, 1965). 
69Hett ~- Ploetz, 121 N.W. (2d) 270 (Wisconsin, 1963). 
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made in discharge of a public duty. The two questions at 
issue were==whether there was an issue of malice for trial, 
and whether the superintendent's letter was protected by any 
privilege. The court held that the superintendent enjoys 
the benefits of a conditional privilege to give a critical 
appraisal of the qualifications of a former employee in a 
letter of reference. On the basis of the facts, the court 
also held no malice existed. 
In a widely publicized case in Oklahoma the publisher 
of~ Magazine appealed a verdict in favor of a member of 
the University of Oklahoma football team. Denit Morris, a 
member of the 1956 Oo Uo football team sued the publisher of 
True Magazine for damages for libel because of a 1958 article 
concerning the use of drugs by the team.70 The article was 
sensationally written and illustrated. The court held that 
the publication was not privileged and upheld the judgment 
for the plaintiff in the sum of $75,000. 
These cases are illustrative of two important concepts 
==whether a statement is privileged because of the position 
of the person making the statement and his official relation= 
ship to that person and whether or not malice is exhibited. 
Most cases involving school personnel will hinge on the 
court's determination of these two factors. 
70Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P. (2d) 
42 (Oklahoma, 1962}. -
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School Patrols 
Control of pedestrians and vehicular traffic is prop= 
erly a police and not a school function. Frequently the 
police department is either unable or unwilling to furnish 
patrolmen so the school undertakes the function for the pro-
tection of its pupils. The position of school patrolman is 
one of great responsibility and the appointment of a minor to 
the job is a risky decision. If an accident should occur, 
a skilled plaintiff's attorney could make a strong case out 
of the contention that a child was appointed to do a police-
man's work. It seems strange, but no case has apparently 
reached the appellate courts involving school patrols. The 
school patrol operation does have legal implications in 
spite of the obvious educational value to the pupils involved 
in the operation. Hamilton expresses this fear when he asks, 
"Is it 'reasonably prudent' to charge an immature child with 
the responsibility of conducting groups of children across 
busy thoroughfares?" He answers by saying, "I have the 
temerity to suggest that such action by school personnel is 
not 'reasonably prudent•. 11 71 
Reynolds Seitz, in an address before the 1962 School Law 
Conference, suggests that the statutes of a particular state 
may give some guidance in this controversial area.72 Most 
authorities agree that the child should not be placed in a 
71Hamilton, p. 115. 
72school Law Conference Report of 1962 (Miami Univer-
sity, Oxford, ·o'fiio), 1962. · 
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position where he is actually expected to direct craffic from 
a position in the street. Seitz summarizes his remarks by 
stating that: 
· It is my belief that school authorities should never 
set up a patrol until they have exhausted all other 
means of getting crossing protection. School author-
ities should first turn to the police. If their 
request is turned down they should ask for volunteer 
help from adults. If that endeavor brings no 
results, then the school authorities should consider 
the possibility of hiring part-time adult help. If 
funds are not available, then it would seem that the 
school would be safe in setting up a school patrol. 
However, remember some crossings may be so hazard-
ous that it would be unreasonable to expect children 
to function on school patrols.73 
One California case, in 1964, dealt with the absence of 
a school patrol. 74 In this c·ase a five-year ... old boy attend-
ing kindergarten was struck by a car at a major intersection 
about 500 feet from school. The intersection, controlled by 
traffic lights, was a heavy traffic artery with peak flows 
at hours when children walked between home and school. The 
boy was struck at noontime, one of the peak periods. Safety 
patrols which the school had maintained at the intersection 
at a time prior to the accident, had been removed over the 
protests of a parents' group. The court held that the 
school was not guilty of negligence in the absence of a spe-
cific statute obligating them to provide traffic protection 
to pupils to and from school. 
73Ibid., p. 8. 
74wright v. Arcade_SchoolDistrict, 40 Cal. Rptr. 812 
(California, 1°9'64). 
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A few states have general protective statutes for school 
personnel but if school patrols are to be continued, persons 
in education should insist on statutory protection for those 
charged with administering the programo 
Field Trips and Errands 
Field trips are generally acknowledged to be one of the 
many sound educational procedures that enrich the curriculum. 
These trips also present hazards that may be encountered dur-
ing travel and at the siteo No case has been found which 
attempted to hold the teacher or principal liable for pupil 
injury while on a field trip. Some cases have been insti-
tuted by the injured child or his parents against the agency 
·visited. There seems to be some distinction made if the 
host stands to gain some benefito In this case the pupils 
are-·called invitees and if no benefit accrues to the host 
the pupils are said to be licensees. 
Sometimes the school administration may require written 
parental consent before permitting a student to participate 
on a field tripo No language on a field trip permission 
slip can absolve teachers from the responsibility to super-
vise during the hours they are away from school. It is 
necessary, however, to give the parent sufficient information 
concerning the mode of transportation, route, time and other 
conditions, so that the parents cannot claim that they 
really did not understand the full implications of the 
request to permit students to go on field trips. 
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Although field trips may be quite educational some 
should not be taken at allo If the reasonably prudent par-
ent or teacher can foresee that conditions of danger exist 
to which children of a certain age should not be exposed, 
field trips should not be taken. A permission slip would 
not be a defense if the child were injured by encountering 
a hazard to which he should not have been exposed. 
Gauerke, in his book School~' suggests that when a 
teacher gets away from the foqr=walls concept of education, 
the following steps should be taken: 
1. 
2. 
3 .. 
4. 
5 0 
6. 
7. 
More than ordinary care should be exerted 
Reasonable rules governing pupil conduct should 
be formulated 
Students should be taken only in small groups 
Secure permission of parents, even though they 
can't sign away parental rights 
Secure qualified supervisors 
Investigate hazards 
Urge board to accept trips as a part of the 
educational program75 
Hamilton notes that the pupils are usually in a holiday 
mood and are often difficult to manage. He feels the pos= 
sibilities of accidents multiply as the distance traveled 
and the number of pupils increase.76 
There is no legal authority for the teacher to use 
pupils as messengers, either for the district or for the 
teacher's uwn personal needs. Even if the district had the 
authority to send pupils on errands, it has not been dele= 
gated to the teacher. The possibilities of student injury 
75warren E. Gauerke, School Law (New York, 1965), p. 103. 
76Hamilton. 
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are greatly increased away from the school's familiar sur-
roundings. It is fairly well settled that a teacher may be 
held liable for injuries suffered by pupils sent on errands 
at the direction of the teacher. A teacher may also be lia~ 
ble if the pupil sent on the errand,! inflicts injury on a 
third party. The pupil is legally an agent of the teacher, 
and the laws of agency apply. 
A Connectic4t case, in 1960, illustrates the prevailing 
opinion concerning sending pupils on errands.77 A student 
in a play production class was sent to a schoolroom to get 
some paint. In order to reach the paint, she had to move 
some cumbersome stage scenery which fell and injured her. 
The court, ruling against the teacher, held that the falling 
scenery was a foreseeable incident. 
Not all cases result in judgment against the teacher or 
school board. In a Louisiana case a high-school boy was sent 
on an errand by his teacher with the consent of the princi-
pal.78 He was traveling by car and was struck by another car 
and injured. His father sued the school board to recover dam= 
ages and medical expenses arising from injuries sustained in 
the accident. The court held against the plaintiff on the 
technicality that the complaint failed to allege that the 
boy's injuries resulted from any fault or negligence of the 
school board. 
77snyder v. Town of Newtown, 161 A. (2d) 770 (Connecti-
cut, 1960. · -
78Harrison v. Caddo Parish School Board, 179 So. (2dl 
926 (Louisiana, T965). 
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School authorities face an even greater hazard by send-
ing students on errands off the schoolgrounds. Indeed, the 
school has absolutely no right to send a child on errands 
off the schoolgrounds during school hours unless parental 
permission is obtained. 
Student Teaching 
The almost complete absence of reported cases involving 
student injury which occurred when the student was under the 
direction of a student teacher leaves the question of lia-
bility for such injury uncertain. It is generally believed 
that student teachers will profit most from their practice 
teaching if they are sometimes given complete freedom and 
responsibility but most legislatures have not specifically 
provided for this, so the supervising teacher is not free to 
abandon her legal responsibility and liability for the con-
duct of the class. Certainly no class should be left in 
charge of a practice or student teacher until the regular 
teacher and supervisor have observed that the practice teach-
er has arrived at the point of experience where it is reason= 
able to expect that she can handle the class. It would 
probably be advisable for the regular teacher even then to 
remain within hearing distance on her first few departures 
from the roomo 
Two cases involving the liability of student teachers 
have arisen, both of them in New York, a sample state where 
school districts are held liable for the negligent torts of 
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their employees.79,80 In both cases, the court found the 
. 
school districts liable and awarded damages to the plaintiff. 
In the Gardner case, the court reversed the lower court which 
held an unavoidable accident occurred when a seventh grade 
female pupil was injured doing a "head stand". The Board of 
Regents had adopted a syllabus on physical education making 
it mandatory for all pupils to take courses in physical 
education. The court pointed out that in order to be certi-
fied to teach physical education, one must have completed a 
I 
four year academic program leading to a .degree or its equiva-
lent. The only person present when the accident occurred 
was a third year junior who was a cadet or student teacher. 
The court said that this exercise was highly dangerous and 
the school was grossly negligent in not requiring a quali-
fied person to be present. 
The Brittain case also involved an injury in a physical 
education program. The plaintiff was given a physical fit-
ness test to determine her eligibility for admission to 
Cortland State Teachers College. She sustained permanent 
injury to her leg during one of the qualifying tests. 
Although a qualified physical education instructor was in 
charge of the tests, he was not actually present when the 
accident happened. The test was being administered by a 
senior physical education student and the court, citing 
79aardner y_. State, 10 N.Y.S. (2d) 274 (New York, 1939). 
SOBrittain v. State, 103 N.Y.S. (2d) 485 (New York, 
1951). . -
Gardner, held that he was not qualified to administer a 
potentially hazardous piece of equipment. The court also 
cited the statute requiring a degree or its equivalent in 
order to teach physical education. 
State legislatures are beginning to recognize the un-
certainty governing the legal status of student teachers. 
During 1965 the legislative bodies of Florida and Illinois 
enacted laws protecting school employees and specifically 
included student teachers. The Florida Statute authorizes 
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county school boards to provide legal service for employees 
sued for damages while on duty supervising and gives legal 
status to student teachers so as to provide similar protec-
tion.Bl The Illinois Statute provides for "save harmless" 
protection for school officers and employees, including 
student teachers.82 
College supervisors, school boards, administrators and 
teachers should insist that the legislatures of all states 
clearly define the legal status of student teachers and 
their supervisors. 
81ch. 65-42 Florida Statutes 1965. 
82s. B. 801 Illinois Revised Statutes, 1965. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The law is not static, but usually the change is barely 
perceptible even to the skilled observer. Legal and educa-
tional writers have been freely predicting for many years the 
demise of the immunity from tort liability status enjoyed by 
governmental agencies. To many, the judicial legislative 
conflict over the issue seemed resolved by the Molitor Case.l 
The courts of Wisconsin, Arizona and Florida followed suit 
and Iowa and Colorado failed by one vote margins in their 
supreme courts to add their states to the list of states 
throwing off governmental immunity by judicial decree.· A 
few states are also abrogating the doctrine by legislative 
enactment, the latest being Nevada and Utah in 1965. Many 
more states have enacted legislation allowing school dis-
tricts to purchase liability insurance, but most are careful 
to preserve the immunity status by specifically exempting 
those districts not choosing to purchase the liability insur= 
ance. In spite of these in-roads, governmental immunity from 
tort liability still prevails in most states today. 
lMolitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District _No. 302, 
163 N.E. (2d) T45 (Illinois, 1962). 
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The schools are rapidly expanding their activities into 
areas formerly classified as "proprietary". The courts are 
increasingly refusing to differentiate between governmental 
and proprietary functions as far as liability to the dis-
trict is concerned. This changed attitude of the courts 
reflects the changing concept of our society concerning the 
role and function of the schools. 
It is likely that employees of the school have enjoyed 
.some benefit from the immunity given the school district. 
This "carry over". benefit is likely to decline as abrogation 
of the immunity doctrine increases. Many states, school 
districts and professional organizations are taking some 
action now to protect the agents and employees of the dis-
trict from drastic financial loss in the future. 
Conclusions 
School districts, school boards or other agencies in 
charge of public scq,oolS---are_ not insurers of the safety of 
pupils or other persons, but they may be held liable for 
negligence or the failure to exercise reasonable care under 
the circumstances. It is the duty of the school authorities 
to supervise the conduct of children on the school grounds 
and to provide and enforce such rules and regulations as are 
necessary for their protection. School district employees 
who fail to ex~rcise ordinary care are liable for injuries 
resulting from their negligence. However, such liability 
attaches, only if the injuries are the proximate result of 
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the negligence of the school employeeo Some of the more 
common defenses for teachers against negligence are: (1) The 
student assumed risk, (2) It was an unavoidable accident, 
(3) Teacher acted as a reasonably prudent person would under 
the circumstances, (4) Intervening cause, and (5) There was 
contributory negligence on the part of the student. 
All accidents that occur under the jurisdiction of the 
school are of great concern to the administrator, board mem~ 
ber, and teacher. Pupils generally are required by law to 
attend school and their youthfulness coupled with compulsory 
attendance calls for the utmost effort from all persons in-
volved in their safety. The National Safety Council pub~ 
lishes a Student Accident Reporting Guidebook2 which should 
be required by all districts not presently using a similar 
standard reporting procedure for accidents. Written records 
are needed, not only in personal liability cases, but also 
as guides for developing or changing policies and procedures 
regarding pupil safety. Dangerous or hazardous conditions 
can be pinpointed more accurately and quickly when uniform 
accident reporting forms are utilizedo 
When the state sets up certain legal provisions for 
teachers, it grants them certain rights and privileges 
accorded because of their status and position. It also 
expects them to recognize certain obligations to society and 
especially to their pupilso What these obligations are have 
2student_Accident ReXorting Guidebook, National Safety 
Council, 425 N. Michigan ~venue, Chicago, Illinois, 1966. 
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been defined by the state legislatures, state or local boards 
of education and by individual school policieso A more com-
plete knowledge of these laws and policies is the responsi-
bility of all persons in the public school service. 
It seems certain that further change in school district 
immunity is forthcoming. The primary purpose of school 
districts is to provide an educational program for the pupilso 
It is not likely that a.drastic change in this purpose will 
be necessitated by futur.e modification of the immunity 
doctrine. Several sound procedures already adopted in a few 
states, are worthy of consideration by other states. 
Governmental immunity should be abolished by legisla-
tive enactment and a system of compulsory state-wide self-
insurance should be initiated to pay claims arising from 
judgments. Mandatory "save harmless" legislation should be 
passed to free school district agents and employees from the 
danger of lawsuit inherent in their positions. Legal counsel 
should be provided by the district to all employees involved 
in school-connected tort liability court actions. 
If the school district provides a sound program and if 
the employees and agents of the district exercise reasonable 
care and judgment in performing their duties, damage claims 
are not likely to disrupt the program of education. 
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